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Preface 
This draft final report presents work on the project “The impacts of fiscal devaluation”, 
Specific Contract no. TAXUD/2011/DE/338, implementing Framework Service 
Contract no. TAXUD/2010/CC/104 for the provision of economic analysis in the area 
of taxation. 
 
The main research question of the project is summarized as: What are the 
macroeconomic and distributional consequences of fiscal devaluation for a selection of 
countries and the EU as a whole? The selected countries are France, Italy, Spain and 
Austria. 
 
The project aims to perform four tasks: 
1. Provide a review of the impacts of fiscal devaluations in the light of economic 
literature and former studies. 
2. Use suitable models to analyse macroeconomic impacts of fiscal devaluation in the 
selected countries and do a comparative analysis of the results obtained in different 
countries. 
3. Analyse distributional impact of fiscal devaluations with the help of models in the 
selected countries and link these results, if possible, to the macro-level analysis. 
4. Analyse the suitability of the policy for the EU as a whole with the help of model 
simulations and in the light of the country-specific results. 
 
We gratefully acknowledge the comments on the interim version received from Ruud 
de Mooij, Cathal O’Donoghue and European Commission staff. 
  
9 
Study on fiscal devaluation 
 
Executive Summary 
Before joining the Economic and Monetary Union, governments could conduct an 
autonomous monetary policy and an autonomous exchange rate policy. Indeed, when 
countries faced a lack of competitiveness and poor growth prospects, devaluing its 
currency was in practice a commonly used instrument to correct external imbalances, at 
least temporarily. As this policy option is no longer available to members of the EMU, 
a substitute for external devaluation has attracted new attention.  
 
The effects of an external devaluation might be mimicked by a tax swap called internal 
or fiscal devaluation. Fiscal devaluation refers to a budget-neutral reduction of payroll 
taxes matched by changes in other taxes or in government expenditures (Calmfors, 
1998). In the standard example, a reduction of employers’ social security contributions 
(SSC) is financed by raising the VAT rate. It is easy to see how this tax reform might 
stimulate the economy. When nominal wages are not immediately adjusted to the 
reduction in the SSC rate, labour costs are reduced and net exports increase. At the 
same time, a higher VAT rate depresses consumption and imports, while exports 
remain exempted from VAT. As a consequence, output expands and the trade balance 
improves. 
 
This study examines the effectiveness of fiscal devaluation by using a combination of 
macroeconomic and microsimulation models. Whereas the literature on fiscal 
devaluation focuses on short-run implications, we also discuss the long-run effects of 
shifting from wage to consumption taxation. We discuss in particular the following 
research questions for a selection of four countries: France, Italy, Spain and Austria. 
What are the macroeconomic consequences for a devaluing country both in the short 
run and the long run? What are the distributional implications for different income 
groups and household types in the long run? And does a country benefit more from a 
unilateral than from a multilateral implementation of the tax shift? The study is 
structured along four tasks. 
Task 1: Literature overview 
Wage and consumption taxation are known to be equivalent in the basic model which 
considers flexible wages and only labour income. The intuition is that the composition 
of taxation does not matter for employment and consumption as long as the real after-
tax wage is not affected. The literature distinguishes two departures from the basic 
model that break down this neutrality result. First, shifting from direct to indirect 
taxation has real effects if the nominal wage is not flexible but rigid, because the real 
after-tax wage returns only slowly to its initial level in this case. Second, when non-
labour income is considered, the tax reform amounts to shifting part of the burden from 
10 
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workers to non-workers. The consumption tax is less distortive than the wage tax in this 
case, because the former tax is also imposed on existing wealth. 
 
Fiscal devaluation might thus be effective in stimulating employment, GDP and net 
exports but the literature survey suggests that the benefits are likely to remain small. 
The effectiveness is sensitive to specific features of the tax-benefit system and the 
economic structure, in particular to the degree of indexation of social transfers and the 
wage elasticity of labour supply. Targeting the cut in SSC might be beneficial for both 
equity and efficiency. 
 
Even when fiscal devaluation is only temporarily effective, its implementation might be 
attractive for accelerating the adjustment on imperfectly working labour markets. 
However, this tax swap should be considered as a complement and not as a substitute 
for structural reforms that are required to address fundamental causes of external 
imbalances and poor growth prospects. An additional remark concerns the efficiency 
gains that arise from unexpectedly taxing consumption expenditures out of existing 
wealth. Relying frequently on this type of tax surprises will erode the credibility of the 
government and the effectiveness of the reform.  
Task 2: Macroeconomic effects of unilateral scenarios 
We have simulated the macroeconomic effects employing two types of models. The 
econometric NiGEM model is more appropriate for analyzing short-run dynamics, 
while the general equilibrium models developed by CEPII1 and IHS are preferred for 
assessing long-run effects.  
 
Fiscal devaluation is found to have a small, short-lived expansionary effect on 
employment and GDP for all considered countries in the short run. In contrast to most 
other studies, the NiGEM model finds a (marginal) worsening of the trade balance 
(after 9 years). Other studies argue that the trade balance effects are dominated by the 
improvement in external competitiveness. However, according to NiGEM estimates, 
the increase in imports following the expansion of domestic demand offsets the relative 
price effects, which explains the reduction in net exports. While the literature considers 
that the improvement of the trade balance initially drives the GDP expansion, the 
NiGEM results point at the increase in domestic demand. Since fiscal devaluation shifts 
part of the tax burden from workers to non-workers (i.e. transfer recipients and capital 
income earners), the expansive effects of the SSC cut dominate the contractive effects 
of the VAT hike. Given the rigid nominal wage, it achieves a temporary reduction in 
real labour costs, which results in a higher employment and a lower unemployment. At 
the same time, consumer prices fall and real consumer wages rise, leading to a higher 
                                                     
1 The CEPII model focuses on the French economy. 
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domestic demand. As the nominal wage is gradually increased, the expansionary effects 
fade away over time. Whether negative or positive, the effects on the trade balance 
likely remain small. 
 
The general equilibrium models report a permanent, though small expansion of 
employment and GDP, while the trade balance is hardly affected in the long run. These 
effects are driven by two main channels in the IHS model. First, the wage cost is 
permanently lower because the bargaining position of workers weakens when social 
transfers are not indexed to the higher VAT. Second, shifting from wage to 
consumption taxes implies redistribution from current to future generations. Existing 
generations have to pay unexpectedly higher VAT, while they benefit less from the 
lower SSC. Future generations benefit from a less distortive taxation system. As a 
consequence, long-run consumption increases while the trade balance slightly worsens. 
Task 3: Microeconomic effects of unilateral scenarios 
The long-run distributional effects are obtained using detailed tax-benefit 
microsimulation models for the four countries. We first consider the distribution of 
equivalent disposable income. When the SSC reduction applies to all employees, we 
find that fiscal devaluation is in general regressive, irrespective of whether only the 
standard rate or all VAT rates are raised. When the SSC reduction is targeted to low 
income groups, the impact of the reform becomes in general progressive, except in 
France and Spain with uniform VAT rate. Sensitivity analysis shows that these 
distributive results are confirmed when the cut in SSC rates is targeted to a common 
share of low earners in each country. In Italy and Austria the distributive effects of 
fiscal devaluation are more favourable to the poorer deciles than in the two other 
countries. When the analysis is conducted in terms of equivalent expenditures, the 
distributional effects do not significantly change, becoming only slightly more 
progressive (except for France).  
 
Next, we look at groups defined by the employment condition of the household head. In 
general, the biggest beneficiaries are households of dependent workers; these are 
manual workers in Italy and Spain and non-manual workers in France and Austria. In 
contrast, households of pensioners and self-employed workers are harmed the most. We 
finally discuss distributional effects on households with different compositions. In 
general, households of adults with or without children are the biggest beneficiaries, 
while the elderly are most adversely affected by the reform. 
Task 4: Macroeconomic effects of multilateral scenarios 
We have considered two multilateral scenarios. We increase the number of devaluing 
countries from 3 in the first scenario to 6 in the second scenario. We find that GDP in a 
12 
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devaluing country increases more in the unilateral scenario than in the multilateral 
scenarios and that the gains are lower when more countries conduct the reforms 
simultaneously. Net exports (as %GDP) fall the least when GDP increases are the 
smallest, meaning that the trade balance weakens less when more countries implement 
the reform.  
 
Effects on aggregate GDP of the Euro Area are ranked in an opposite order than found 
for the individual, devaluing economies (at least after 5 years). In case fiscal 
devaluation is implemented by the largest six countries, a contraction of GDP during 
the first years is followed by the strongest expansion during the last years. 
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1 Introduction 
When faced with a lack of competitiveness and poor growth prospects, a country that 
has control over the exchange rate can resort to devalue its currency. Since this policy 
option is not available to (individual) members of a monetary union, these countries 
have to consider an alternative to correct external imbalances.3 An alternative is a tax 
reform that might mimic the effects of an external devaluation which is called fiscal or 
internal devaluation. 
 
Fiscal devaluation can be described as a budget-neutral reduction of payroll taxes 
matched by changes in other taxes or in government expenditures (Calmfors, 1998). 
Various combinations are possible but the study focuses on the typical example 
consisting of a reduction of employers’ social security contributions (SSC) and a rise of 
the VAT rate.4 With a rigid nominal wage, the reduction in the SSC rate lowers unit 
labour costs and improves competitiveness and hence increases net exports. At the same 
time, a higher VAT rate reduces consumption and imports without having a bearing on 
exports. As a consequence, output expands and the trade balance improves. 
 
Fiscal devaluation is a topic that is not yet much analyzed in the theoretical literature 
but more debated in policy circles (Farhi et al., 2011). Some European countries already 
have experience with implementing a type of fiscal devaluation. Early examples include 
Denmark in 1988 and Sweden in 1993 (see Calmfors, 1998). Germany increased in 
2007 the VAT rate by 3% points to finance the reduction of contributions to the 
unemployment insurance scheme (IMF, 2012). In 2011 fiscal devaluation was proposed 
in the IMF-EU adjustment programme for Portugal but this country was reluctant to 
raise the VAT rate. Finally, a French plan in 2012 proposed to increase the standard 
VAT rate by 1.6% point to co-finance a cut in employers’ social contribution. However, 
the evidence on existing reforms is too weak to identify any causal relationship (IMF, 
2011). 
 
This study substantially contributes to the existing literature and policy discussion by 
applying a combination of macroeconomic and microsimulation models to analyze 
fiscal devaluation in countries for which simulation studies are not yet available. The 
study is not restricted to the short-run impact of fiscal devaluation but also considers the 
long-run effects of the tax swap. In particular, although distributional concerns are 
frequently stressed, a detailed analysis of the distributional implications of shifting from 
direct to indirect taxes seems to be underexposed in the literature. 
 
                                                     
3 This does not exclude that policies of the ECB or a large country can affect the exchange rate of the euro. 
4 Another example, proposed in Portugal, consists of a shift from employers’ SSC to employees’ SSC. 
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The report is structured along the four tasks, listed in the Preface. The next section 
summarizes the literature on fiscal devaluation. Starting with the benchmark case in 
which wage and consumption taxes are equivalent, we discuss the conditions under 
which the tax shift becomes effective in fostering employment and GDP. Section 3 
briefly describes the structure and features of the macroeconomic and microsimulation 
models used in this study. The following 4 sections discuss the simulated effects of 
fiscal devaluation unilaterally implemented in each of the considered countries. The 
results are subsequently discussed for France, Italy, Spain and Austria. After explaining 
the results obtained with the macro-models, we present the distributional analysis per 
country. In Section 8, we compare main results across countries and summarize general 
findings. The final section presents the simulation outcomes for three multilateral 
scenarios.  
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2 Literature survey 
2.1 Introduction 
This section summarizes the literature on fiscal devaluation. Instead of discussing in 
detail study by study, we organise the survey around a number of themes. The studies 
that are covered can be classified into three groups. 
 
The first group consists of theoretical studies. Main studies in this group are Calmfors 
(1998, Section 3), EC (2008), Lipińska and von Thadden (2012), Farhi et al. (2011), 
Correia (2011), Franco (2011, Section 2) and IMF (2011, 2012). The second group 
includes simulation studies. EC (2006, 2008 and 2011) report analyses using different 
versions of the QUEST-model; Bank of Portugal (2011) and Boscá et al. (2012) discuss 
the simulation of a tax shift in Portugal and Spain, respectively. Table 2.1 lists the main 
features of these simulation models.5 The last group consists of econometric studies, 
which are limited to Franco (2011, Section 3), de Mooij and Keen (2012) and Boscá et 
al. (2012, Section 2). 
Table 2.1: Main features of simulation studies 
 EC (2006) EC (2008) EC (2011) Bank of Portugal 
(2011) 
Boscá et al. (2012) 
Country EU15 i. Euro area 
ii. Germany 
iii. Ireland 
Unspecified 
small euro-
member 
Portugal Spain 
Tax shift Labour → VAT Labour → VAT SSC → VAT SSC → VAT SSC → VAT 
Budget closure Ex ante by VAT Ex ante by  
labour tax 
Ex ante by  
labour tax 
Ex ante by  
SSC 
Ex ante by lump 
sum transfer 
Indexation of 
social transfers 
No Yes No NA NA 
Nominal 
interest rate 
Depends on 
inflation 
Depends on 
(core) inflation 
Fixed Fixed Depends on inflation 
and output gap 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
Indexation of 
transfers 
i. Labour 
supply 
elasticity 
ii. No 
indexation 
iii. Trade 
elasticities 
i. LR debt 
reduction 
ii. Indexation 
iii. Labour 
supply 
elasticity 
Labour supply 
elasticity 
i. Share of rule 
of thumb 
consumers 
ii. Bargaining 
power workers 
iii. Trade 
elasticities & 
openness 
iv. Wage rigidity 
                                                     
5 We do not include studies that are not sufficiently documented or not publicly available. 
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The structure of this section is as follows. In the next subsection, we first describe the 
benchmark case in which wage and consumption taxes are equivalent. In the following 
two subsections, we show two cases in which the neutrality of tax shifts breaks down. 
In section 2.3, non-neutrality, at least in the short run, is caused by the introduction of 
wage rigidities, while in section 2.4 efficiency gains result from taxing non-labour 
income. After having discussed the main reasons why fiscal devaluation might work, 
we elaborate on factors that determine the degree of its effectiveness. Section 2.5 shows 
that the effects of the tax shift are sensitive to whether social transfers are adjusted to 
increases of the VAT rate. Section 2.6 considers anticipated and transitory tax swaps. 
Section 2.7 discusses additional effects when the setting of the nominal interest rate 
reacts to changes in inflation. Section 2.8 compares the spillovers between a unilateral 
and a multilateral implementation of the tax reform. Section 2.9 assesses the sensitivity 
of the outcomes to the values of the price elasticity of imports and exports. A tax shift 
might have differential consequences for different firms and households, which is 
explained in Sections 2.10 and 2.11, respectively. Section 2.12 focuses on econometric 
studies that have estimated effects on government revenues and the trade balance. In a 
last section we summarize the general findings of the survey. 
2.2 Equivalence between wage and consumption taxation 
We start with a simple, static model to demonstrate under which conditions 
proportional wage and consumption taxation are equivalent.6 A single worker decides 
on the optimal level of consumption and labour supply. Initially only a proportional 
wage tax (or SSC) at rate  is imposed on the employer.7 The reform consists of a 
budget-neutral full shift from wage to consumption taxes. Variables before and after the 
reform are denoted by the subscripts b and a, respectively. The budget constraint before 
the reform is written as: 
 
              (1) 
 
where W the wage (after the wage tax), L labour supply and C consumption. We assume 
that the abolition of the wage tax is fully shifted to the worker, meaning that 
. After the reform the restriction becomes:  
 
           (2) 
 
where t denotes the consumption tax rate. 
 
                                                     
6 For a more general discussion, see Auerbach (2009). 
7 We simplify the analysis by abstracting from personal income taxation and employee’s SSC. 
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Inspection of both budget constraints shows that the real wage  is not 
affected if the tax rates meet the condition: 
 
               (3) 
 
Labour supply does not change with a constant real after-tax wage. Since the wage cost 
 is not affected, labour demand also does not change and equilibrium on the 
labour market still holds. With constant real after-tax income, real consumption C does 
not change. Finally, it is easy to see that tax revenues are constant using condition (3):  
 
            (4) 
 
In sum, a budget-neutral shift from wage to consumption taxes does not have any effect 
in this model. However, the equivalence result is not robust to extensions of the basic 
model. For instance, the coexistence of income and consumption taxes might be 
optimal in the case of different losses due to tax evasion and compliance (EC, 2008).8 In 
the following subsections we will discuss two other departures from this basic model 
that break down the equivalence result.  
2.3 Wage rigidities 
The effectiveness of fiscal devaluation is explained in most of the studies by assuming 
downward rigid nominal wages, which initially results in disequilibrium on the labour 
market.9 This channel is illustrated in Figure 2.1. It presents labour demand in function 
of the wage cost  and labour supply in function of the real wage. With a 
flexible wage, the labour market clears at the wage rate . As explained above, any 
tax shift that leaves the ratio  unchanged will not affect real outcomes. 
The reduction of the wage tax  increases labour demand while the increase in the 
consumption tax t decreases labour supply for a given wage. The revenue-neutral tax 
swap increases the nominal wage to  but employment is not affected. 
                                                     
8 In addition, taxes on consumption and production can clearly be used to correct for externalities. 
9 Dickens et al. (2007) find a considerable degree of wage rigidity across 15 European countries and the 
US. They estimate that an average of 28% of workers is covered by downward nominal rigidity, ranging 
from 4% in Ireland to 58% in Portugal. 
18 
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Figure 2.1: The effect of a tax shift on the labour market 
 
We now assume that the nominal wage is rigid, or  is fixed. When the fixed wage  
exceeds the market-clearing (or long-run) level, labour demand is smaller than supply, 
resulting in unemployment of . With a fixed wage, fiscal devaluation increases 
employment and decreases unemployment (to ). Under the assumption that the 
extra wage income is spent on consumption, ex post budget neutrality allows for a 
smaller increase of the consumption tax rate, and the figure can be extended with a 
rightward shift of the supply curve. 
 
However, the beneficial effects are not permanent in this model. When the nominal 
wage is gradually adjusted to its market-clearing level, employment converges to its 
unaffected long-run level . Even without having long-lasting benefits, a more 
attractive transition path might be attainable by fiscal devaluation. Starting from 
disequilibrium on the labour market, fiscal devaluation contributes to accelerate the 
adjustment and to minimize the costs arising from rigidities (see IMF, 2011).  
 
Lipińska and Von Thadden (2012) analyses the tax shift in a stylised two-country 
model of a monetary union.10 The base case considers symmetric countries, complete 
asset markets (i.e. both home and foreign consumers own risky claims to home and 
                                                     
10 This paper extends Lipińska and Von Thadden (2009) by incorporating incomplete asset markets and 
wage rigidity. 
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foreign output), rigid prices but flexible wages. The nominal interest rate is constant 
and the calibrated share of non-labour income is small. The finding that the tax shift 
stimulates short-run employment and output is explained as follows. Under complete 
assets markets, the gains of lowering the tax burden on home production are shared 
with foreign asset owners. As a result, home consumers experience a fall in wealth. As 
this negative wealth effect dominates the effect of a lower real consumer wage, labour 
supply increases and consumption decreases. The higher labour supply depresses the 
nominal wage. Since only a small fraction of the producers immediately adjust output 
prices, the real producer wage falls and labour demand increases. Since the foreign 
consumers benefit from an opposite wealth effect, foreign production falls and foreign 
consumption expands. As a result, the home terms of trade (defined as the ratio between 
the import price and the domestic good price) increases.  
 
However, these GDP effects strongly depend on the degree of financial integration. In a 
scenario with incomplete asset markets, only domestic consumers own risky claims to 
their output. In the absence of wealth leakages to foreign consumers, domestic 
consumers now enjoy a positive wealth effect. The combination of a positive wealth 
effect and higher real consumer wages dampens the increase in labour supply and thus 
output. Spillovers on the foreign economy are negligible and the terms of trade increase 
becomes small. 
 
Finally, Lipińska et al. (2012) extend the model with sticky nominal wages. The effect 
of this alternative specification is easily understood by remembering the initial effect on 
the flexible nominal wage in the base case. When assets markets are perfectly 
integrated, a reduction in the short-run nominal wage is found. If such fall is precluded 
by sticky wages, the smaller improvement of competitiveness dampens the increase in 
output. In contrast, fiscal devaluation becomes more effective when the assumption of 
sticky wages is combined with imperfect financial integration. If wages are flexible in 
this case, producers have to pay higher nominal wages in the short run. Since this 
increase occurs more gradually with sticky wages, the terms of trade and thus 
production increase more in this case. Furthermore, they find long-run output gains due 
to a permanent increase in the endogenous terms of trade. This result stands in contrast 
to studies that argue that the tax shift is only effective in the short run due to sticky 
wages. 
 
Franco (2011) considers wage rigidity in a version of the model of a small open 
economy. He claims that wage rigidity is necessary to affect competitiveness on impact. 
With rigid nominal wages, labour costs are initially more driven by the reduction of the 
SSC rate, allowing for lower output prices. In contrast to Lipińska et al. (2012), Franco 
(2011) simulates larger output effects in the short run than in the long run because his 
model does not result in permanent effects on the terms of trade.  
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Now that we have demonstrated how fiscal devaluation might affect output, we discuss 
its effectiveness in improving the trade balance. The tax shift affects the trade balance 
through two types of effects: substitution effects and income effects (see e.g. EC (2008) 
and Franco (2011)). First, when the domestic firms shift lower taxes on to prices, 
domestic products become cheaper relative to foreign products. The resulting switch of 
domestic and foreign consumption towards domestic goods reduces imports and 
expands exports, respectively. Second, imports increase following the expansion of 
output achieved by fiscal devaluation. Real consumption is expected to fall due to the 
higher VAT but the higher investment and export demand contribute to higher imports 
(Government consumption will increase if specified as a constant fraction of GDP).11 
The income effect on foreign demand can be neglected in a unilateral scenario. In 
principle, the total effect on imports is not determined a priori, but the substitution 
effect normally dominates the income effect. Notice that the same conditions hold for 
an external devaluation. Falling imports and rising exports contribute both to an 
improvement of the trade balance.  
 
Simulation studies find that fiscal devaluation has positive but small effects on the trade 
balance in the short run, whereas the long-run effect is negligible. IMF (2011) 
overviews results obtained for a tax shift in Portugal (equal to 1% of GDP). The short-
run effect on net exports ranges between 0.2% and 0.6% of GDP. EC (2011) provides 
another example in which a tax swap, equivalent to 1% of GDP, is analysed for an 
unspecified, small EMU-member. The impact effect on net exports peaks at slightly 
over 0.1% of GDP in the base scenario. The sensitivity of the trade balance effects is 
assessed in subsection 2.9. 
2.4 Non-labour income 
So far we neglected non-labour incomes, like capital income and private pensions. The 
following subsection focuses on the special features of transfers (including public 
pensions). After extending the model with non-labour income, we will show that the 
change in the tax mix will stimulate the economy due to a tax base broadening 
argument, even in the long run and with price flexibility.  
 
Next to the worker, we incorporate another type of consumer who receives all the non-
labour income Y. For simplicity, we specify that no taxes are imposed on Y and that Y is 
not affected by the reform.12 The budget restrictions of the non-worker are: 
 
              (1’) 
            (2’) 
                                                     
11 Keen and Syed (2006) use a similar argument to explain that an increase in corporate taxes is found to 
increase net exports on impact. 
12 When Y is taxed at rate τ, we are back in the base model of section 2.1. 
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where D denotes consumption of the non-worker. The base of the wage tax is the wage 
sum WL, whereas the base of the consumption tax now becomes C+D. Since the 
consumption tax base is larger, the same amount of tax revenues is obtained with a 
lower tax rate. With , condition (3) no longer holds with equality and the real 
after-tax wage increases after replacing the wage tax by the consumption tax. In terms 
of Figure 2.1, the labour supply curve shifts to the right, resulting in a higher 
employment and a lower wage cost in the new equilibrium. Employment improves 
since the reform shifts part of the tax burden from workers to non-workers. Therefore, 
the consumption tax is equivalent to the combination of a wage tax and a lump sum tax 
on non-labour income. In other words, replacing the distortive wage tax by a less 
distortive consumption tax improves the efficiency of the economy but the purchasing 
power of the non-workers worsens in the absence of compensation.  
 
In addition, moving toward consumption-based taxation reduces the tax bias against 
saving, which increases permanently GDP growth. Johansson et al. (2008) argue that 
consumption taxes are more growth-friendly than income taxes. However, robustness 
analysis by Xing (2011) and IFS et al. (2011, Chapter 11) find no strong evidence for 
favouring consumption taxes over income taxes. Angelopoulos et al. (2012) simulate 
reforms of the tax structure in the UK with a general equilibrium model with 
endogenous growth. They find that replacing labour taxes by consumption taxes has 
small positive effects on long-run growth but substantial welfare gains. 
 
To the extent that efficiency gains are obtained by taxing by surprise income from 
existing wealth (including pension income), a reservation should be made on the virtues 
of the tax shift. The productive capacity and growth prospects of the economy will 
suffer from the fear of households and firms that future taxes are unexpectedly 
increased. Loss in government’s credibility precludes conducting frequently this type of 
tax reforms. 
 
Furthermore, a social contribution might affect the labour supply decision differently 
than a general wage tax (IMF, 2011). Social contributions are less distortionary when 
they are linked, in real or in perception, with benefits. A tax reform that weakens the 
link between contributions and benefits has adverse effects on labour supply. For 
example, Disney (2004) breaks the public pension contribution down into an ‘actuarial’ 
(with link to benefits) component and a tax (without link) component. In contrast to the 
former component, increasing the tax component is found to reduce labour supply (in 
particular of women). IMF (2012) therefore argues that the SSC cut in Italy should be 
restricted to the component for which the link with benefits is weak. 
 
Labour taxation is more distortionary when labour supply is more elastic. The 
permanent stimulus of employment and output is clearly sensitive to the elasticity of 
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labour supply with respect to the real wage. When labour supply responds stronger to 
changes in the real wage, reduction of the tax burden on labour income results in larger 
output gains. EC (2008, Table IV.3.4) performs a sensitivity analysis for the case of a 
tax shift from labour taxes to VAT in Germany. Doubling the labour supply elasticity 
from 0.25 to 0.5 more than doubles the long-run effects on employment (from 0.22% to 
0.58%) and output (from 0.20% to 0.53%). Similar results are found in EC (2011). 
 
We finally comment on the assumption that Y is not affected by the reform. When 
capital income is considered to include potential revaluation effects arising from 
holding external assets or debt, this assumption is reasonable for internal devaluation 
but not for external devaluation (see Correia, 2011). Suppose a country has an external 
debt in foreign currency. An unexpected devaluation of the exchange rate increases the 
value of the debt measured in domestic currency, which corresponds to a negative 
wealth effect. In contrast, the (nominal) value of wealth is not affected by fiscal 
devaluation. Farhi et al. (2011) show in a theoretical framework that an additional 
instrument is required to achieve equivalence between external and internal 
devaluation. The negative wealth effect arising from external devaluation is reproduced 
by supplementing internal devaluation by a transfer from the domestic country to the 
foreign country, or by a partial default of the foreign country on assets held by domestic 
residents. An opposite transfer is required when the external devaluation creates a 
domestic wealth gain.13 
2.5 Indexation of transfers 
Government transfers, like unemployment benefits and public pensions, are other 
examples of non-labour income and hence fit in the previous discussion. However, two 
specific channels are distinguished in the case of transfers. 
 
First, transfers have to be financed by government revenues. When transfers are not 
adjusted for increases of consumer prices, outlays in real terms fall, which would allow 
for an extra reduction of the labour tax rate. When the government opts for indexing 
transfers to avoid the adverse distributional consequences, less room is left for 
stimulating employment. This is illustrated by introducing fully indexed transfers in the 
model. We assume it is never attractive for the worker to become a non-worker. The 
initial budget constraint of the non-worker remains identical to (1’), but the left-hand 
side of the constraint after the tax shift is adapted for the indexation of the transfers: 
 
          (2”) 
 
                                                     
13 Calmfors (1998, Section 3) concludes in general that internal devaluation is an imperfect substitute for 
external devaluation. Correia (2011) concludes, using three stylized models, that fiscal devaluations and 
exchange rate devaluations are equivalent under extremely strong conditions. 
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We specify that tax revenues equal expenditures on transfers, implying that the budget 
restrictions of the government are: 
 
              (5) 
           (6) 
 
This shows that workers pay the same amount of taxes in both cases. In other words, 
this model is equivalent to the base model in which the tax shift has a neutral effect on 
employment.  
 
Notice this channel also operates in perfect markets and flexible prices. With an 
imperfect labour market, a second channel interacts with the first channel. When wages 
are set by (individual or collective) bargaining, the equilibrium wage depends on the 
outside option of the worker. When the unemployment benefit is not linked to 
consumer prices, an increase in the VAT rate will reduce the real value of his outside 
option. Worsening the worker’s bargaining position will result in lower wage costs and 
a higher equilibrium employment. Employment gains get smaller with a larger degree 
of indexation of transfers.14 In the case that transfers are not fully indexed, both 
channels are another cause of permanent effects on the labour market. 
 
Simulation analysis confirms that results are sensitive to the specified degree of 
indexation of transfers. EC (2008, Table IV.3.4) compares long-run outcomes of a tax 
shift in Germany. When transfers recipients are fully compensated, employment 
expands by 0.22% after 20 years. The effect almost doubles (to 0.43%) when no 
indexation is considered. Effects on GDP are similar (0.20% versus 0.47%). Similar 
examples can be found in EC (2006, 2011). 
2.6 Timing issues 
In the stylized static model, we considered permanent, unexpected policy changes. 
Calmfors (1998) argues that an internal devaluation is characterized by a slower 
decision-making process than an external devaluation Due to implementation lags 
associated with major tax reforms, announcement will give extra intertemporal 
substitution effects. In anticipation of the higher future VAT rate, consumption and 
output already increase at the time of the announcement of the future tax shift. 
However, at the time of implementation, consumption and output fall below the path 
resulting from an unexpected policy change. Simulations of Lipińska et al. (2012, 
Section 5.3) show that announcing a tax shift four quarters ahead has sizable effects. 
                                                     
14 A similar argument holds in case of a binding minimum wage. When the nominal minimum wage is 
fixed, a shift to consumption taxes will reduce the structural unemployment. 
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Estimations in Carare and Danninger (2008) suggest large anticipatory effects of the 
VAT hike in Germany in 2007. 
 
Instead of a delayed implementation, Franco (2011, Figure 5) considers a transitory tax 
shift. Production (of tradables) still expands in the short run but consumption falls in 
anticipation of the return of the VAT rate to a lower level. As a consequence, a much 
stronger improvement of the current account is achieved.  
2.7 Monetary accommodation and exchange rate regime 
In the case of a small economy, a constant nominal interest rate is commonly assumed. 
If fiscal devaluation is analysed for a large economy or a large group of countries, 
additional effects emerge from the reaction by monetary policy. First, we discuss an 
interest rate rule that targets pre-tax inflation (i.e. core inflation excluding VAT).16 If 
the reduction in labour costs leads to lower union-wide inflation of producer prices, the 
central bank reacts by reducing the nominal interest rate, which stimulates interest-
elastic demand.  
 
The interest rate setting has an additional effect via the impact on the exchange rate vis-
à-vis non-eurozone countries. In the previous sections we assumed fixed nominal 
exchange rates. Fiscal devaluation is considered less effective with a flexible exchange 
rate. In most of the models the nominal exchange rate is determined by the uncovered 
interest parity condition (e.g. the difference between the home and the foreign short-run 
interest rate equals the rate of depreciation of the home currency).17 A reduction of the 
nominal interest rate following the tax shift will cause an appreciation of the euro, 
which undoes the competitiveness improvement. Fiscal devaluation will therefore be 
more effective if the fraction of the trade denominated in a fixed exchange rate is high. 
In addition, IMF (2012) argues that a unilateral devaluation will have a limited effect on 
the euro exchange rate when a country features a low fraction in the external trade of 
the euro zone. However, trade flows only have a minor, direct impact on the short-run 
exchange rate. More relevant is the weight of the country in the interest rate rule 
adopted by the ECB. Small euro members can less influence the interest and exchange 
rates.  
 
EC (2008) reports that the induced monetary effects are small relative to the real 
effects. When a revenue-neutral tax shift from labour taxes to VAT (by 1% of GDP) is 
simulated for the whole euro-area, inflation reduces by maximal 28 points (in the first 
year), the nominal interest rate is lowered by 20 points and the euro appreciates against 
                                                     
16 The interest rate setting depends on pre-tax inflation in the QUEST-model of EC and the NAWM-model 
of ECB. Coenen et al. (2012) illustrate the sensitivity of fiscal multipliers to the degree of monetary 
accommodation in these and other DSGE models. 
17 See the QUEST model in EC (2008) and the NiGEM model in Barrell et al. (2007). 
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the dollar by 0.38% (in the second year). When the tax shift is only implemented in 
Germany, the fall in German inflation of 8 points only leads to a decrease in the interest 
rate of 5 points and an appreciation of 0.09%.18 
 
Lipińska et al. (2012, Section 5.2) also study an alternative specification of the 
monetary policy rule in terms of the after-tax inflation (including VAT). When the 
inflationary pressure from the higher VAT rate induces the central bank to raise the 
nominal interest rate, output and consumption in the short run are lower compared to a 
scenario with a constant interest rate.19 
2.8 Unilateral versus Multilateral fiscal devaluation 
In the previous sections, we studied the effects of fiscal devaluation in a single country, 
neglecting policy responses in other countries. How is the effectiveness affected when 
the tax shift is simultaneously undertaken in many countries? The answer depends on 
two types of spillovers. First, competitiveness is clearly a relative concept: improving 
the competitiveness of one country goes at the expense of the competitiveness of 
another country. The effects on net exports get smaller if fiscal devaluation is applied in 
several countries. If these effects dominate, fiscal devaluation runs the risk of triggering 
international tax competition. Second, the expansionary effects of shifting to a more 
efficient tax structure are beneficial for other countries as well. These positive 
spillovers are larger when more countries participate in a coordinated fiscal 
devaluation.  
 
EC (2008) provides outcomes for Germany in a unilateral and a multilateral scenario. 
At the current circumstances, Germany is not the best example for simulating fiscal 
devaluation. However, country-specific results for the multilateral scenario are only 
reported for Germany. The German figures are therefore only used to illustrate the 
relative sizes of the channels. A first scenario considers a coordinated tax shift among 
all EMU-members. Output in Germany increases by 0.09% in the first year and by 
0.23% after 20 years.20 When only Germany conducts the tax swap, the improvement of 
competitiveness leads on impact to a larger output expansion (0.11%). However, this 
gain is temporary as it is eroded by real wage adjustments, resulting in a smaller output 
increase in the long run relative to the multilateral scenario (0.20%).21 
                                                     
18 As expected, the interest and exchange rates are not affected if the reform is only undertaken in Ireland. 
19 The tax shift is implemented in one of the two identical countries of a monetary union. 
20 According to EC (2008, Box IV.3.1), the finding that the GDP effect is larger in the long run than in the 
short run is due to the shift in taxation from wages to capital income. The resulting higher net real 
consumer wage leads to a permanent positive labour supply response. In combination with a constant 
capital-labour ratio (due to a constant user cost of capital), higher employment results in a higher GDP in 
the steady state. 
21 As discussed in the previous section, gains are also smaller due to the smaller effects on the nominal 
interest rate and exchange rate in the unilateral scenario.  
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2.9 Trade elasticities 
The effectiveness of fiscal devaluation depends on the size of the response of export 
and import demand to changes in the terms of trade. When domestic and foreign 
tradables are assumed better substitutes, imports fall more and exports expand more if 
the price of the domestic good is reduced relative to the price of the foreign good. EC 
(2008, Table IV.3.4) reports the sensitivity of long-run effects of a tax shift in Germany 
to the price elasticity of tradables (The more relevant short-run effects are not reported). 
In the base scenario with a trade elasticity of 2, long-run GDP increases by 0.20%. In an 
alternative scenario with a higher elasticity of 5, the output gain is 0.24%. The results 
seem rather robust to values of the trade elasticities. Output prices need to fall less 
when domestic and foreign goods are better substitutable. However, workers are able to 
quickly capture the competitiveness gain by claiming a relatively higher real wage. 
Boscá et al. (2012, Table 3) examine the sensitivity of the short-run effects of fiscal 
devaluation in Spain. They find that doubling the price elasticities of imports and 
exports hardy affect the GDP effect after two years (0.76% versus 0.74% in the 
baseline). Similarly, Lipińska et al. (2012, Table 4) discuss the introduction of home 
bias in consumption. This can be interpreted as a reduction of the substitution elasticity 
between domestic and foreign goods. They find that the home bias assumption has a 
dampening but negligible effect on output and consumption in the long run. 
 
Franco (2011) considers the extreme scenario with price-taking firms. If the economy is 
a price taker on foreign markets, export demand is perfectly elastic and the export price 
is constant. As the tax shift cannot affect the value of exports, the trade balance and 
output are considerably less improved in the short run (see Figure 4). If, in addition, the 
firms also have no market power domestically, the positive income effect is not longer 
counteracted by the negative substitution effect on import demand and even a 
deterioration of the trade balance results. 
2.10 Sectoral decomposition 
Related to the previous section is the sensitivity to the size of the nontradable sector. 
The larger the nontradable sector, the more diluted are the effects on the trade balance 
(Franco, 2011, Figure 4). The decrease of the SSC rate reduces labour costs and 
producer prices of home produced nontradables and tradables, but not the producer 
price of foreign produced tradables. Therefore, nontradables become cheaper relative to 
the composite of tradables, which induces a shift of consumption to nontradables. This 
leaves less room for substitution between domestic and foreign tradables, leading to a 
smaller improvement of the trade balance. 
 
Feldstein and Krugman (1990) add that the impact on consumption of tradables and 
nontradables might depend on the specific VAT design. On the one hand, tradables are 
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believed to be more heavily taxed than nontradables. A prominent example is the 
reduced VAT rate applied to nontradable labour-intensive services and the exemption 
of financial services. Increasing the reduced rate less than the standard rate then 
strengthens the substitution in favour of nontradables. On the other hand, consumption 
of some tradables benefit from reduced or even zero VAT rates. Food products are 
prime examples for many EU countries. Therefore, the impact on the trade balance 
depends on the specific interactions between the VAT system and sectoral features. 
 
In this respect, labour intensity is another important feature that might cause differential 
effects across sectors. Whereas an external devaluation has on impact the same 
proportional effect on export and import prices of all commodities, internal devaluation 
has a larger effect on more labour-intensive commodities (IMF, 2011).22 Moreover, 
when labour costs fall relative to the cost of capital, substitution elasticities will 
determine the extent to which capital is replaced by labour in production.23 Fiscal 
devaluation will not affect the capital/labour choice only if an equivalent subsidy on 
capital is added to the reform (Farhi et al., 2011). 
2.11 Distributional considerations 
Distributional effects highly depend on the specific design of the tax reform. In section 
2.4 we have already pointed at the differential impact on households receiving wage 
income, capital income or social transfers. Increasing VAT revenues may involve 
changes in the zero rate, the reduced rate, the standard rate and/or exemptions. IFS et al. 
(2011, Chapter 9) illustrate that these measures have different distributional effects on 
subgroups of households. 
 
Changes in SSC could be broad based or targeted at particular groups of workers. 
Restricting the SSC cuts to lower wage levels might be supported by both equity and 
efficiency arguments (see IMF (2011) and EC (2008)). Focusing cuts in SSC on low-
paid workers offsets their loss in real income due to the higher VAT rate. In addition, 
when low-paid workers respond stronger to changes in net wages, a selective cut in 
SSC generates a larger efficiency gain.24 
 
Some models allow for a different impact on liquidity-constrained and non-liquidity-
constrained households. The QUEST-model, as applied in EC (2008), assumes that 
liquidity-constrained households (with a population share of 40%) do not save and that 
they only receive labour income and indexed social transfers. In contrast, non-liquidity-
                                                     
22 Labour intensity is restricted to domestic value added, excluding imported intermediate inputs. 
23 Note that labour is the only production input in the stylized models of Lipińska et al. (2012) and Franco 
(2011). 
24 De Mooij and Keen (2012, Box 1) are critical about targeting SSC cuts at new employment and at small 
firms. 
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constrained households own financial wealth and therefore receive capital income, next 
to labour income. Since the total income of the liquidity-constrained households 
benefits more from fiscal devaluation, their consumption expands more than the 
consumption of unconstrained households. In contrast, in the base case of EC (2011), 
transfers are not indexed and constrained households can consume less on impact, while 
consumption of unconstrained households still increases. 
 
Decoster et al. (2010) evaluate the distributional consequences of a tax reform for 4 
countries (Belgium, Hungary Ireland and the UK), using the EUROMOD micro-
simulation models. The simulation considers a reduction of the SSC rate of the 
employees (by 25%), financed by an increase of the standard VAT rate.25 Welfare is 
found to fall for the lower expenditure deciles, meaning that the gain from a higher 
disposable income is dominated by the loss from higher consumer prices.26 The pattern 
is reversed for the higher deciles. Since social contributions are more progressive than 
the standard VAT, welfare effects expressed in terms of nondurable expenditures 
increase over the deciles.27 
 
Thomas and Picos-Sánchez (2012) simulate a reduction in SSC rates financed by an 
increase in VAT rates in 13 European countries, using the OECD Taxing Wages 
models integrated with data on the consumption patterns of different households types, 
obtained from Household budget surveys for each country. For various representative 
family types, they compute the average and marginal “combined” tax wedges before 
and after the fiscal devaluation. In most cases, they find a reduction in average and 
marginal tax wedges after the reform, with a great heterogeneity in the results for 
different countries. The sizes of the reductions, however, are in general not very large, 
since part of the SSC burden still falls on workers who must pay greater VAT rates. The 
authors also stress that part of the burden of the reform will be shifted to non-worker 
households, like the unemployed and pensioners. In France the benefit is extended also 
to families of high-income workers, while in Austria low-income workers do not 
significantly gain from the reform. Finally, in Spain the reform seems well targeted on 
low-income workers. 
2.12 Econometric studies 
The impact of individual taxes is extensively explored in the literature. Concerning the 
effects of VAT, we refer to the surveys in IFS et al. (2011). In particular, it discusses 
                                                     
25 Expenditures on nondurables are affected by income changes but not by changes in relative prices. 
Savings, quantities of durables and labour market behaviour are assumed constant.  
26 The number of deciles that are confronted with welfare losses ranges from 4 in Ireland to 6 in Hungary. 
27 Boeters et al. (2008) simulate a harmonization of VAT rates, combined with a cut of the SSC rate with a 
static AGE model for Germany. Next to macroeconomic effects, they report distributional effects on the 3 
terciles. The average welfare effect is positive but the lowest tercile loses.  
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econometric studies on the relation between VAT and trade neutrality (Chapter 7, see 
also de Mooij and Keen, 2012); pass-through to consumer prices (Chapter 8); growth, 
consumption, labour market and tax revenues (Chapter 11). Studies on SSC seem to 
focus on assessing its incidence on workers. OECD (1990) concludes based on 
aggregated data that the burden of these taxes is borne by wage earners in the long run. 
Micro studies find more mixed evidence on the impact on net wages (see e.g. Saez et 
al., 2012). This subsection focuses on econometric studies that deal explicitly with the 
effects of fiscal devaluation.  
 
Franco (2011) assesses the effects of fiscal devaluation on government revenues and the 
trade balance for Portugal by estimating two Structural Vector Autoregression models. 
The first VAR model contains nominal consumption, real imports and the effective 
VAT rate. A positive (unexpected) shock of one standard deviation in the effective 
VAT rate is found to reduce nominal consumption by 2% after 2 years and by 3% after 
5 years. These effects are considered to approximate the effects on the VAT base. 
Following the same shock, real imports fall by 6% after 2 years and 8% after 5 years. 
Confidence intervals are large but all effects are significantly negative. In view of the 
small number of quarterly observations, a separate model is estimated, containing the 
nominal wage bill, real exports and the effective SSC rate. A one standard deviation 
increase in the effective SSC rate decreases the nominal wage bill by 3% after 2 years 
and by 5% after 5 years. Real exports are reduced by 2% after 2 years and 3% after 5 
years.  
 
Based on these estimated elasticities, he next simulates the effects of fiscal devaluation. 
Ex ante budget neutrality is met when an increase of 1 standard deviation in the 
effective VAT rate is combined with a decrease of 1.6 standard deviation in the 
effective SSC rate. As the SSC base expands more than the VAT base shrinks, tax 
revenues increase in all quarters. The fall in imports and the rise in exports result in a 
substantial improvement of the trade balance. Franco (2011) concludes that the 
empirical analysis seems to support the efficacy and the feasibility of a fiscal 
devaluation in Portugal. 
 
De Mooij and Keen (2012) provide empirical evidence that fiscal devaluation might 
have a quite sizable impact on the trade balance. They estimate an error correction 
specification on a panel of 30 OECD countries over the period 1965-2009.28 They find 
that for euro countries reducing the employers’ social contributions by 1% of GDP 
improves net exports by around 3% of GDP in the short run (with the government 
balance unchanged). This effect converges to zero in the long run. In contrast, changes 
                                                     
28 In an earlier study, Keen and Syed (2006) consider a less rich dynamic specification. Moreover, they 
estimate the impact of corporate taxes and the VAT on net exports, without discussing the effect of a 
budget-neutral tax shift. 
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in VAT revenues have an insignificant effect both in the short run and in the long run. 
Combining these estimates suggests that a shift of 1% of GDP from SSC to VAT 
improves significantly net exports in the short run (by 4% of GDP), but this effect is not 
permanent. These results should be interpreted with care since they are not fully robust 
and vulnerable to endogeneity issues.  
 
Finally, Boscá et al. (2012) find a significantly negative relationship between the 
current account and the ratio of social security contributions over consumption taxes in 
a cross-section of EU15 countries. The estimates imply that an ex ante shift of 1% of 
GDP improves the current account between 1.8% and 3.4% of GDP. 
2.13 Conclusion 
This literature survey suggests that fiscal devaluation can have positive though small 
effects on employment, GDP and net exports. The reform has real temporary effects if 
the nominal wage is not immediately adjusted to the tax shift. Permanent effects are 
found if consumption taxation is less distortive than wage taxation. The effectiveness is 
found to be sensitive to particular features of the economy, in particular the degree of 
indexation of social transfers and the wage elasticity of labour supply. Whether the tax 
system becomes less or more progressive depends on the particular design of the tax 
shift. Targeting the cut in social contributions at low-paid workers makes the reform 
less vulnerable to the trade-off between efficiency and equity. It is remarkable that 
studies that evaluate fiscal devaluation in Portugal seem to find rather substantial 
effects (Bank de Portugal (2011) and Franco (2011)).  
 
Even when its benefits are not permanent, fiscal devaluation might be an effective 
instrument to accelerate adjustments to competitiveness and employment problems. 
However, a tax shift cannot be used as an adequate substitute for structural reforms to 
address fundamental problems underlying external imbalances and weak growth 
prospects.  
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3 Description of the methods 
Before we discuss the simulation results in the next section, we describe the main 
features of the macro and micro-analyses. 
3.1 Macro analysis 
We use three models to conduct the macro-simulations. Its features are listed in Table 
3.1.1. For studying short-run dynamics we prefer the econometric NiGEM model. The 
general equilibrium features of the other models make them more appropriate for 
analyzing long-run effects. The IHS model is available for the four countries 
considered, while the CEPII model focuses on the French economy.  
Table 3.1.1: Main features of macro simulation models 
 NiGEM IHS CEPII 
1. Type New-Keynesian 
model, estimated 
AGE model, 
calibrated 
AGE model, calibrated 
2. Coverage Multi-country Single country France 
3. Base year 2000/2005 2009 2006 
4. VAT rates one effective 
consumption tax rate 
one effective VAT 
rate 
VAT rate per good 
5. # goods 1 1 19 
6. SSC rate one effective labour 
tax rate 
employer & employee 
effective rate (per 
generation & skill) 
employer & employee 
effective rate 
7. Nominal interest 
rate 
depends on nominal 
GDP & inflation target 
exogenous endogenous 
8. Wage 
determination 
Error Correction 
Model 
wage bargaining with 
immediate adjustment 
wage bargaining with 
immediate adjustment 
9. Elasticity labour 
supply 
0 (exogenous) depends on skill 0 (exogenous) 
10. Budget closure ex ante with labour tax 
rate 
ex post with lump sum 
tax 
ex post with lump sum 
tax 
11. External trade Error correction 
specification of import 
and export equations 
Single homogenous 
good; net exports 
traded at fixed world 
price 
Domestic and imported 
goods are imperfect 
substitutes; exports are 
function of terms of trade 
12. Exchange rate Determined by 
uncovered interest rate 
parity 
Fixed at 1 Real exchange rate 
follows from eq. on the 
balance of payments 
13. Expectations Forward-looking  Perfect foresight Static expectations 
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ETLA: NiGEM model29 
NiGEM (National Institute Global Econometric Model) is a quarterly model, which 
uses a ‘New-Keynesian’ framework in that agents are presumed to be forward-looking 
but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to external events. NiGEM 
consists of interlinked submodels for different countries and regions, including all EU 
countries (except that Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus are only implicit in a larger 
group). NiGEM is structured around the national income identity and is based on 
estimation using historical data.  
 
Fiscal devaluation, in the form of a decrease in social security contributions and an 
increase in consumption taxes, affects the wage – price dynamics in the model. The 
wage-price block is based on the right to manage formulation where bargaining 
determines the real wage. Real wages, therefore, depend on the level of trend labour 
productivity as well as the rate of unemployment. Taxes affect real wages indirectly via 
these variables. Labour markets in the model embody rational expectations and wage 
bargainers use model consistent expectations.  
 
NiGEM is especially useful for modelling fiscal devaluation since it captures both 
short-run dynamics and cross-country spillovers. As a quarterly model it captures the 
short-run dynamics. The dynamics of wage development depend upon the error 
correction term, which determines the long-run adjustment, and on the split between 
lagged inflation and forward inflation as well as on the impact of unemployment on the 
wage bargain. Consumer prices are determined by import prices, production costs, 
profit mark-up (that depends on capacity utilization), and consumption taxes. The 
dynamic adjustment to fiscal devaluation depends on the parameter values and varies 
between countries.30 Finally, the model captures cross-country effects of fiscal 
devaluation. One country affects other countries via exports and imports, and where 
applicable also through exchange rate adjustments. 
IHS: Dynamic AGE model per country31 
This model is a single-country dynamic computable general equilibrium model with a 
detailed description of labour markets and the public sector. It quantifies the impact of 
public policy and exogenous shocks on labour supply, output, consumption and other 
macroeconomic variables on the transition path and in the long run. These impacts can 
differ within and across generations, and across skill levels. 
                                                     
29 See the description on http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/logon/nigem.php?sw=0&ftyp=1&t=3&b=1. 
30 For example, the estimated error correction coefficient in the wage equation ranges from -0.09 in France, 
-0.15 in Italy, -0.16 in Spain to -0.33 in Austria. This implies a half-life adjustment of 7.3, 4.3, 4.0 and 
1.7 years, respectively. It shows that the wage reaches its long-run level much quicker in Austria than in 
France.  
31 See the detailed documentation in Berger et al. (2009). 
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Agents have perfect foresight and behaviour relies on micro foundations. In a static 
search unemployment framework, households endogenously decide on skill levels, 
continuous training efforts, participation in the labour market, search effort if 
unemployed, hours supplied and retirement, as well as the intertemporal allocation of 
their consumption. The model handles three skill groups and eight overlapping 
generations. Each household goes through 8 life-cycle stages, with age classes: 15-19, 
20-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-69, 70-79, 80-84 and 85-92 years. Starting their life (at age 15), 
households decide which skill level they want to achieve. Households who choose to 
educate only a little (low skills) work from age 15; to educate mildly (medium skills) 
work from age 20; to educate a lot (high skills) work from age 25. Retirement takes 
place when a household is in the 55-69 life-cycle stage. 
 
Profit-maximizing firms make capital investment, hire, train and fire workers. Wages 
are set by bilateral bargaining between workers and firms. The bargaining power 
determines how the surplus is split that arises from the match between workers and 
firms. Wage rigidities are not included. To capture realistic components of production 
and better simulate dynamic responses after reforms, the model assumes capital 
adjustment costs and capital-skill complementarity, where low skill workers can be 
substituted more easily by capital than medium and high skill workers. The government 
raises revenues by taxing consumption, profits, labour and capital income as well as by 
payroll taxes and social security contributions both on the employees’ and the 
employers’ side. It provides a variety of social insurance, retirement pensions and basic 
firm subsidies. 
 
In the model it is assumed that there is only one type of good (i.e. the real exchange rate 
is fixed at one) and that the country takes the interest rate as given. It is operational for 
14 EU countries.32 
 
The model can be used to simulate per individual country the effects of fiscal 
devaluation raising value-added taxes and reducing taxation on labour (in several 
forms) in a revenue neutral way on various macroeconomic outcomes. Intra- and inter-
generational effects can also be quantified. As the model is designed for single small 
open economies we can assess the effects of taxation on its trade position against the 
rest of the world. However, effects on bilateral trade flows between individual countries 
are not captured. 
                                                     
32Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, and UK. 
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CEPII: macro model for France 
CEPII developed a macro model focusing on the French economy.33 This model is a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with 19 sectors and 
international trade (distinguished between the Euro zone and the rest of the world).34 
Workers are differentiated by three skill levels. Labour supply, for each skill level, is 
assumed fixed and workers are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors implying 
that wages have to be identical for each sector. Wages are bargained by workers and 
firms implying that the unemployment rate is endogenous for each skill level. Total 
consumption expenditures of the representative household are a constant fraction of 
disposable income (i.e. this is not derived from intertemporal optimisation). The 
distribution of expenditures over the 19 goods and services as well as the composition 
into domestic and foreign goods follows from utility maximization subject to a budget 
constraint. In each demand component, domestic and imported goods are imperfect 
substitutes. The domestic price is endogenously determined in order to equilibrate the 
demand and supply of goods for each sector. Domestic firms export at the same price as 
on the domestic market, whereas import prices are exogenous. The exchange rate 
adjusts to guarantee the equilibrium of the balance of payments. Household saving is a 
constant fraction of disposable income while the government deficit and the change in 
net foreign assets are a fixed share of GDP. Equilibrium on the domestic capital market 
determines the interest rate. 
3.2 Microsimulation analysis 
The distributional analysis of fiscal devaluation at the micro (household) level is 
conducted with the use of four different tax-benefit microsimulation models, described 
at the beginning of the sections devoted to the results for each country.35 The 
simulations are concerned only with the long-run effects of fiscal devaluation. In the 
micro-analysis, therefore, we assume that there is no change in the level of 
employment, that the reduction of employer SSC rates translates into an increase in 
wages and that the increase in VAT rates will bear entirely on consumers, therefore 
with a corresponding increase in prices. This last assumption, i.e. the full incidence of 
                                                     
33In the offer we intended to follow a micro-macro approach based on a static CGE model and a 
microsimulation model, fully integrated. We developed a new, dynamic version of the macro model to 
make the fiscal devaluation simulations comparable to the ones of the other teams. However, solving the 
micro and macro model simultaneously became a too cumbersome exercise. Therefore, we had to decide 
to run both models completely separated which has presumably minor consequences for the results at the 
micro and macro level. In Appendix 1, we present the micro effects using the macro results obtained with 
the CEPII macro model, while the microsimulation effects presented in Section 4.2 are obtained using the 
macro results of the IHS model (as in the intermediate report). 
34 The model is described in Magnani and Carré (2012), which is available on request. 
35 The models have been built following different rules and use a variety of datasets. These differences may 
play a role in the results obtained. The simulations performed involve the analysis of both income and 
consumption, and it is not yet available a uniform European-wide micromodel that simulates in an 
integrated fashion both direct and indirect taxes.  
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VAT on consumers, is not very problematic (see IFS et al. (2011) for a discussion), 
particularly when considering the long run hypothesis and in the case of a change in all 
VAT rates or in VAT rates that represent a significant share of total expenditure. The 
assumption of full translation of reduced employer SSC into higher wages is, on the 
other hand, more debatable, but is consistent with the idea that in the long run the FD 
has not lasting effects on real variables like output or employment; if labour supply in 
the long run is given, then a fall in SSC produces an increase in wages. In general, the 
incidence should fall mostly on workers since labour supply is considered to be more 
rigid than labour demand. Gruber (1997), for example, finds evidence of a full shift of 
social security contributions on workers, and full shifting is the assumption 
incorporated in many studies of the distributional impact of taxes (Fullerton and 
Metcalf, 2002).36 Also Ooghe et al. (2003) find that SSC are shifted (for more than 
50%) to the employees. Other studies obtain more mixed results. More recently, many 
studies have emphasised the fact that SSC incidence may depend also on the 
institutional characteristics of the labour market, for example the degree of bargaining 
centralization or the strength of the link between contributions paid and benefits 
received by workers. Among these more mixed results, Saez et al. (2012), for example, 
find that workers are compensated for changes in employer contribution rates (as we 
assume here), but not if they are subject to increased employee rates. Our assumption of 
complete incidence finds some justifications both in theory and in some empirical 
results, but is in any case very strong, although standard in microsimulation analyses of 
this kind. In the short run or in specific national contexts, therefore, more mixed 
incidence results are possible.  
 
In order to link the distributive analysis with the results from the macro models, the 
percentage change in the levels of SSC rates that has been computed in the IHS macro 
model (and that corresponds to 1% of GDP) is used as an input in the microsimulations.  
 
The basic distributive results will be provided in terms of changes in disposable income 
or consumption by deciles of equivalent (pre-reform) income and also by deciles of 
equivalent (pre-reform) expenditure. There is indeed a long-standing debate about the 
choice of the appropriate monetary measure of the economic standard of living: income 
or consumption (see IFS et al., 2011, Chapter 9). This problem is particularly relevant 
in the case of a change in VAT rates, since the distributive impact of indirect taxation as 
a whole is typically regressive when measured in terms of disposable income, but turns 
out to be generally slightly progressive on expenditure, given the presence of multiple 
tax rates on different goods and services. In analyzing shifts between direct and indirect 
taxation, it is not clear whether one will obtain a more meaningful picture of the 
                                                     
36 Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) state that “for the payroll tax, virtually all applied incidence studies assume 
that both the employee share and the employer share are borne by the employee (through a fall in the net 
wage by the full amount of payroll tax). 
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distributional impact of the change by dividing gains and losses by income or by 
expenditure. For this reason, we will provide a distributional analysis not only by 
deciles of disposable income but also by deciles of expenditure. In addition, we present 
results by family types. It is a well-known fact that the distributional effects are much 
smaller, when the time horizon is extended from one year to the rest of the lifetime of 
individuals. Another point worth mentioning here is that these calculations do not 
consider the lump-sum wealth tax property of VAT, i.e. the fact that an increase in 
VAT rates is likely to reduce the value of real assets (IFS et al., 2011, section 9.4). 
 
We have simulated three different alternative VAT reforms in order to close the public 
budget after a reduction of SSC corresponding to 1% of GDP:  
 
1) An increase in the standard rate of VAT, together with: 
1.1) A general reduction in the rate of employer SSC such that the overall reform is 
revenue neutral. In countries where there are multiple rates of employer SSC, all are 
varied. We assume that the increase in VAT rates determines an increase in prices, and 
that the reduction in the SSC rates produces a corresponding increase in nominal wages. 
1.2) A reduction in the rate of employer SSC levied only on the earnings of low-paid 
workers such that the overall reform is still revenue neutral.  
 
2) A proportional increase in all rates of VAT, together with the same two changes to 
employer SSC ((2.1) and 2.2)).  37 
 
3) The abolition of all zero and reduced rates and the application of a unique VAT rate 
on all goods and services, together with the same two changes to employer SSC ((3.1) 
and 3.2)). Goods and services currently exempted from VAT keep this status.  
 
We have tried to create a link between the macro and micro models not only taking 
from the macro models the % reduction in SSC revenues that represents 1% of GDP, 
but also using the same percentages of the macro models for the identification of the 
group of low-paid workers, so that in Italy 45.7% of employees are considered as low 
earners, in Spain 48.5%, in Austria 18.1% and in France 30%. In the microdata, 
employees are sorted on the basis of their gross incomes and, in the simulation that 
applies the SSC reduction only to low earners, we define as low earners those workers 
that are located below these percentages in the respective national income distribution.  
 
                                                     
37 As in the other two simulations, also in this chase there is a modification in relative prices due to the 
application of a common rate of increase to VAT rates that are of different magnitude. Since the models 
that we use are static, we do not consider the possible behavioural reactions to these changes in relative 
prices. 
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The changes in VAT rates necessary in each simulation to compensate at the aggregate 
level the reduction in SSC rates are applied to the same expenditure categories that are 
currently subject to VAT, without modifications in the composition of the groups that 
are now subject to differentiated rates. The nominal values of the monetary variables 
(income and expenditure in each good or service) are updated to the latest available 
year which is incorporated in the codes for each model.  
 
When dealing with microdata, there is a preliminary grossing-up problem that must be 
dealt with. It is indeed typical for expenditure surveys to underestimate the levels of 
total household expenditure that are provided by national accounts. This 
underestimation can be very substantial, for example the grossed up total expenditure 
estimated from microdata could be only 60-70% of the value from national accounts. 
On the other hand, in the microdata the base of SSC, i.e. labour incomes, is in general 
less underestimated with respect to national accounts, or frequently corrected to provide 
representative information on direct taxes and transfers. In our 2011 TAXUD project on 
VAT, it was decided not to adjust the microdata with grossing-up factors (see IFS et al., 
2011). We have made the same choice in the present context, but with two different 
application rules. In the first case, from the macro simulations, we obtain the % changes 
in VAT and SSC that are equivalent to 1% of GDP, and in the micro analysis we 
modify with the same percentages the VAT and SSC paid, even if these changes do not 
sum up to the aggregates of the National Accounts. In the second case, we take from the 
macro models only the % change in the levels of SSC rates, but search in the microdata 
for the changes in VAT rates that close the public budget.38 This second case is more 
internally consistent and its results will be described in the text, while the other set of 
results is discussed in an appendix.  
 
The distributional analysis is therefore carried out on data not grossed-up to national 
accounts, with real values expressed in the most recently available year, and 
incorporating the most recent legislation that is simulated by each microsimulation 
model. 
 
The definition of disposable income or expenditure (denominators of the incidence 
analysis) includes imputed rents on owner-occupied dwellings.39 In the case of Austria, 
the income dataset (EU-SILC) does not include imputed rents, so they are taken from 
the consumption dataset and added to disposable income after tax-benefit calculations 
have taken effect. The equivalent measures are obtained with the modified OECD 
equivalence scale (with weights 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for other household members 
                                                     
38 Notice that from the macro models we get the % reduction in the rates of SSCs, not the reduction in the 
rates. For example, if in the macro models the SSC rate falls from 30% to 26% of gross earnings, then in 
the microsimulation we apply a reduction of (rates and revenue) SSC by 4%/30%=16.7%. 
39 We have verified that the distributive results do not significantly change with the exclusion of imputed 
rents on dwellings from equivalized income or expenditure. 
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older than 13 years, 0.3 for younger members). The unit of analysis is the household, 
not the individual (i.e., each decile contains 10% of households, not of individuals). 
 
The distributional effects can be significant not only between income or expenditure 
levels, but also across types of households. We therefore provide the distributive impact 
of FD for the following two categorizations of households:  
 
By household type: 
1. 1 adult (18-64), no children (0-17), no elderly (>=65); 
2. 1 adult, with children, no elderly; 
3. >1 adult, no children, no elderly; 
4. >1 adult, with children, no elderly; 
5. 1 elderly, no adult, no children; 
6. >1 elderly, no adult, no children; 
7. at least 1 elderly (different from cases 5 and 6). 
 
By condition of the head: 
1. employee manual worker;  
2. employee worker different from manual and manager (clerks, teachers, etc.); 
3. manager; 
4. self-employed and entrepreneur; 
5. pensioner (from work or other reasons, e.g. invalidity); 
6. unemployed; 
7. other. 
 
The models simulate the effects of the reduction in SSC rates taking account also of the 
consequent variation in the personal income tax and in the amounts of cash transfers, 
depending on the level of disposable income. The increase in disposable income is 
assumed to induce a change in current expenditure equal to the household’s propensity 
to consume multiplied by the change in disposable income. We therefore assume that 
the propensity to consume (or save) out of income does not change, but we allow for 
different variations in total expenditure for a given income change for each household, 
depending on its level of the propensity to consume. If a household of the sample has 
total expenditure greater than disposable income, then the whole change in the latter is 
converted into a corresponding additional expenditure.40  
 
                                                     
40 The assumption of constant budget elasticity may conflict with discussion in relation to expenditure 
reflecting long-term consumption, particularly when we observe a negative savings rate, and particularly 
in the bottom part of the distribution. Expenditure being higher than income may reflect a temporary 
reduction in income being met by dipping into savings. Increases in income as a result of an SSC change, 
therefore, may not result in any change to expenditure, if existing expenditure reflects permanent income.  
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The basic variable that we use to assess the distributive effect of the reform is the 
change in disposable income, defined in the Tables and Figures that follow as the 
increase in monetary disposable income after the reduction in employer SSC rates (and 
the associated variations in personal income tax and income-related cash transfers), 
minus the increase in the VAT necessary to balance the public budget at the aggregate 
level; this change is expressed as a percentage of disposable income before the reform. 
We thus obtain an indicator of the variation in the living standard that takes account of 
the fact that indirect taxation has increased, so with a given disposable income a 
household is now able to purchase a lower quantity of goods and services than before. 
When we analyze the impact of the reform by deciles of equivalent expenditure, the key 
variable is “net expenditure”, defined as the increase in expenditure (that follows the 
increase in disposable income) minus the increase in the amount paid for the value 
added tax.  
 
Before presenting the simulation results of the distributive effects of the FD in Sections 
4 to 7, it may be useful to provide some data about the current distributive impact of the 
value added tax and of social security contributions. The two following graphs show the 
average burden of VAT payments on disposable income and on family expenditure, by 
deciles of both equivalent income and equivalent expenditure. The VAT turns out to be, 
as expected, regressive in terms of income but generally slightly progressive on 
expenditure.  
 
As for the incidence on income, Spain and Italy show very similar patterns, with 
general levels of incidence lower than those found in the two other countries. In Italy 
and Spain, the VAT takes 8-10% of income of lower deciles and 4-6% of income for 
the richest ones. In France, the regressive nature of VAT is evident at the extremes of 
the distribution while in the middle deciles its incidence is roughly constant for most of 
the sample. In all countries the VAT is indeed nearly proportional in the central section 
of the distribution. Among the poorest households, the greatest VAT burden is suffered 
by households living in France and Austria, where VAT represents 12-18% of 
disposable income. Different levels of incidence of the VAT in different countries may 
arise from many factors: the various degrees of under-representation of income and 
consumption in the microdata with respect to the national accounts, different average 
propensities to save, and the application of differentiated tax rates to various groups of 
goods and services.  
 
Turning to the distributive effect of VAT on expenditure, it is progressive in the four 
countries across the entire distribution, and also in this case the incidence among the 
central deciles is fairly flat (Figure 3.2.2). This effect is due to the presence of reduced 
and zero rates for goods and services that represent a greater share of total expenditure 
for households with low levels of total expenditure. For Spain the impact of VAT is 
actually almost proportional. Since the standard VAT rates are very similar in the 
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various countries, the differences in the levels of incidence depend only partially on the 
variability in the standard VAT rates. 
 
Figure 3.2.1: Incidence of VAT on disposable income before the FD by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income 
Figure 3.2.2: Incidence of VAT on expenditure before the FD by deciles of equivalent 
expenditure 
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Figure 3.2.3 shows the ratio between average employer social security contributions 
and disposable income by deciles of equivalent disposable income. SSC are slightly 
progressive in Italy, Spain and Austria, while they are markedly more concentrated on 
higher deciles in France. The share of SSC on incomes may be very different from the 
incidence of SSC on GDP or on different levels of earnings, because the denominator 
here is household disposable income, which contains incomes from all kinds and also 
imputed rents on housing. The incidence of SSC depends also on the distribution of 
earners and of the recipients of non-labour incomes across households and deciles. 
Figure 3.2.3: Incidence of employer social security contributions on income by deciles of 
equivalent disposable income 
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Figure 3.2.4: Average ratio of expenditure to income by deciles of equivalent disposable 
income 
 
In the first decile (Figure 3.2.4) the high values of the ratio between expenditure and 
income depend in part on the presence of very low transitory incomes. In part, these 
high ratios are a consequence of the concentration in the first decile of many young 
households. In Italy, for example, the average age of the reference person is 56.5 years 
for the whole sample, but it is 51.4 in the first decile (56.9 in the second, 58.1 in the 
third). 
 
The fact that for many deciles expenditure turns out to be greater on average than 
income may depend in part also on the presence of very high values of current 
expenditure for some households. For France, for example, if we consider the median 
values of the ratio between expenditure and income, they are always less than 1 except 
in the first decile. The inclusion of durables in total household expenditure can explain 
a significant part of this effect. The burden of VAT is particularly high, in all countries, 
in households composed by a single non-elderly adult, with or without children (Figure 
3.2.5). The families with elderly persons seem to be those more lightly hit by this tax. 
Households with children present intermediate levels of VAT incidence, between 
single-adult and elderly households.  
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Figure 3.2.5: Incidence of VAT on disposable income before FD by type of household  
 
In almost all the countries considered in this study, the incidence of VAT is low on the 
incomes of households of managers, self-employed and entrepreneurs, while it is higher 
for dependent manual workers and particularly on households whose head is currently 
unemployed, i.e. those categories characterised by low saving rates (Figure 3.2.6). In 
Italy, for example, the average propensity to consume is 96% for households with the 
head employed as a dependent manual worker, 90% for other employees, 72% for the 
families of managers, 79% for entrepreneurs and self-employed, 92% for pensioners, 
139% for the unemployed and 92% for the “other” group. 
Figure 3.2.6: Incidence of VAT on disposable income before FD by condition of the 
household head 
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In the following sections, we show only the results for the case in which the increase in 
VAT revenue is sufficient to close the public budget after the fall in SSC, taking also 
into account the increase in the personal income tax and the reduction in cash transfers 
that are inversely correlated with after-tax income. Three alternative modifications of 
the VAT rates are shown in separate sub-sections, each describing the distributive 
results by deciles of (pre-reform) income and expenditure, by household type and by 
conditions of the head.  
 
When applying the reforms that allow for a change in the VAT rates so as to balance 
the public budget in the microdata, we have changed the VAT tax rates as reported in 
Table 3.2.1. These values have been obtained by first reducing in the micro-data the 
revenue of SSC by a percentage that represents, in the macro models, 1% of GDP, and 
then by searching what is the increase in VAT rates that allows making a revenue-
neutral reform.41 These VAT rates do not consider the problem of non-compliance of 
VAT. We must therefore allow for the possibility that non-compliance may get worse at 
higher VAT rates. However, the increase in VAT in these simulations changes its 
overall burden by a small amount, so increased non-compliance may not be a big issue.  
Table 3.2.1: Overview of VAT rates (%) in micro scenarios 
 France Italy 
VAT rates before the FD reform: 2.1 5.5 19.6 4.0 10.0 21.0 
1) Increase only in the standard VAT rate       
     Change in SSC for all 2.1 5.5 23.0 4.0 10.0 26.0 
     Change in SSC for low-paid workers 2.1 5.5 20.5 4.0 10.0 25.0 
2) Proportional increase in all VAT rates       
     Change in SSC for all 2.1 6.0 21.4 4.6 11.6 24.3 
     Change in SSC for low-paid workers 2.1 5.6 20.1 4.5 11.3 23.7 
3) Uniform VAT rate       
     Change in SSC for all 11.4   16.3   
     Change in SSC for low-paid workers 10.8     15.9     
       
 Spain Austria 
VAT rates before the FD reform: 4.0 8.0 18.0 10.0 12.0 20.0 
1) Increase only in the standard VAT rate       
     Change in SSC for all 4.0 8.0 22.5 10.0 12.0 21.8 
     Change in SSC for low-paid workers 4.0 8.0 22.5 10.0 12.0 21.5 
2) Proportional increase in all VAT rates       
     Change in SSC for all 5.0 9.0 21.0 10.7 12.0 21.4 
     Change in SSC for low-paid workers 5.0 9.0 21.0 10.6 12.0 21.1 
3) Uniform VAT rate       
     Change in SSC for all 9.8   16.7   
     Change in SSC for low-paid workers 9.8     16.5   
                                                     
41 It may seem that the uniform VAT needed to make a FD revenue neutral for the budget is implausibly 
low in France and Spain, but we must take account that, for example, in France 50% of total expenditure 
is subject to the 19.6% VAT rate, 45% of total expenditure to the 5.5% rate and 5% to a 0% rate. Making 
a uniform tax rate from these figures is just a matter of computing a weighted average: 
0.5x19.6+0.45x5.5=12.3%. Even this extremely rough exercise provides a result that is consistent with 
what found in the analysis. 
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Table 3.2.2 provides a synthesis of the employer SSC rates and of their changes that we 
have applied in the simulations. The rates refer to all workers or, in the case of Italy and 
Austria, to blue collar workers. Other details are provided in the description of the 
results for each country. 
Table 3.2.2: Overview of employer SSC rates (%) in micro scenarios 
 Current rates Reduced rates for 
all employees 
Reduced rates for low 
earners only  
Austria   reduction by 8.77%   reduction by 83.65%   
Health  3.7% 3.4% 0.6% 
Retirement 12.6% 11.5% 2.1% 
Unemployment 3.0% 2.7% 0.5% 
Family fund 4.5% 4.1% 0.7% 
Other 2.5% 2.2% 0.4% 
Total 26.2% 23.9% 4.3% 
Spain   reduction by 12.2% reduction by 45.5% 
Health, retirement, 
injury 
23.6% 20.7% 12.9% 
Unemployment 5.5% 4.8% 3.0% 
Total 29.1% 25.6% 15.9% 
Italy    reduction by 8.8% reduction by 26% 
Retirement 23.8% 21.7% 17.6% 
Unemployment 1.9% 1.7% 1.4% 
family allowances 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 
Health 2.2% 2.0% 1.6% 
Other 3.6% 3.3% 2.6% 
Total 32.2% 29.3% 23.8% 
France    reduction by 6.6% reduction by 39.6% 
Retirement 9.9% 9.3% 6.0% 
Health 12.8% 12.0% 7.7% 
Family allowances 5.4% 5.0% 3.3% 
Unemployment 4.0% 3.7% 2.4% 
Total 32.1% 30.0% 19.4% 
Indexation of benefits 
Most of the microsimulation results that will be presented refer to the case in which the 
only fiscal parameters that are changed are the SSC and VAT rates. The amounts of the 
personal income tax and of the benefits received can change after the fiscal devaluation, 
but only because gross incomes of workers have changed. The modification of VAT 
rates, however, produces an increase in the inflation rate, and if there are cash benefits 
directed to households that are indexed to the price level, then a more realistic scenario 
should contemplate also an increase in their nominal values corresponding to the 
greater inflation rate caused by the fiscal devaluation. We have therefore simulated also 
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this hypothesis. The increase in the inflation rate due to the fiscal devaluation has been 
computed as follows:  
If  S0 = Total expenditure before increase in VAT rates  = P0(1+t0)Q0  and  
     S1 = Total expenditure after increase in VAT rates  = P0(1+t1)Q1 
 
then total VAT paid before increase in VAT rates:  I0 = t0P0Q0 
and total VAT paid after increase in VAT rates:   I1 = t1P0Q1 
 
We need t0 and t1: 
t0 = I0/(S0-I0) 
t1 = I1/(S1-I1). 
The inflation rate induced by the increase in VAT rates is (1+t1)/(1+t0). After finding 
this inflation rate, we have increased by the same percentage the cash benefits that are 
by law indexed to the inflation rate, and computed the new disposable income and the 
new personal income tax, if some of these benefits are taxable.  
 
To keep the budget balanced, we have multiplied all households disposable incomes 
(after the increase in indexed benefits and the computation of the new personal income 
tax) by a coefficient lower than 1, sufficient to close the budget. In other words, we 
assume that the greater public expenditure for the indexation of benefits is financed 
with a proportional tax on disposable income. Given its proportionality, this “tax” does 
not change the shape of income distribution and the (relative) distributive indexes. The 
distributional impact of indexation of transfers depends strongly on how it is financed, 
and our choice is neutral on this, but can be justified if we consider that the 
distributional impact of many tax systems is not far from proportionality and that we 
cannot guess which instruments the governments will decide to use to find new 
revenues. This procedure has the advantage that the VAT rates do not need to be 
changed with respect to the previous simulations, because we only work at the level of 
disposable incomes. The distributive results incorporating the indexation of benefits 
with revenue neutrality will be presented at the end of the sections devoted to the 
microsimulation analysis for each country. 
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4 Simulations of unilateral fiscal devaluation in France 
In simulating unilateral fiscal devaluation, we strive for a common base scenario in all 
models. Starting in year 1, the SSC is reduced by 1% of GDP while the VAT is 
increased by 1% of GDP. The tax shift is implemented unexpectedly and permanently. 
After the reform is announced, behaviour of forward-looking agents is based on 
adjusted expectations (except for the CEPII model that specifies static expectations). 
Social transfers are not indexed42 and the nominal interest rate is kept constant. After 
presenting the base scenario, we discuss the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
scenarios. 
4.1 Macro simulations for France 
We first discuss the results of the econometric NiGEM model, which focuses on short-
run dynamics. In view of its assumptions and theoretical framework, the CGE models 
of IHS and CEPII are more appropriate for analyzing the long-run effects. To explain 
the full tax shift, outcomes of the two isolated tax changes are also presented. 
NiGEM 
Implementing the tax reform in the first year by 1% of ex ante GDP affects the public 
deficit but this effect is not immediately neutralized in this scenario. The government 
budget is closed by changing the income tax rate, starting in year 5, to ensure 
convergence to a constant debt ratio. Monetary policy is assumed not to react until year 
4. After that the nominal interest rate depends on deviations of inflation (including 
VAT) and nominal GDP from the corresponding targets. Forward-looking financial 
markets anticipate the future change in the interest rate and the euro exchange rate 
immediately responds to the implementation of the reform. 
 
When the reduction in the SSC rate is considered in isolation, the real labour costs fall 
on impact, which strongly increases labour intensity in production (see the red lines in 
Figure 4.1.1). Since labour supply is assumed constant in intensive margin, the increase 
in labour demand results in lower unemployment and higher output. Lower producer 
prices reduce domestic consumer prices, which increase purchasing power of household 
income. Next to the favourable price effects, the higher employment pushes up 
domestic demand. Since the coefficient of domestic demand is large in the import 
equation, import demand increases even though domestic prices are now lower than 
import prices. The increase in exports is limited since export prices react little to the 
                                                     
42In the NiGEM model, transfers depend on the change in the wage bill with a coefficient of 0.25. 
Replacing the current wage bill indexation with price indexation would require new estimations and 
change the model dynamics. 
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lower domestic production costs and the price elasticity of exports is low.43 As a result, 
the trade balance deteriorates. The direct loss of social contributions is insufficiently 
compensated by higher tax revenues resulting from the expansion of domestic activity, 
and the public balance weakens. 
 
In later years, lower unemployment and higher capacity utilization raise domestic 
wages and prices gradually above the initial level. Real producer wages return to the 
initial level and production and employment gains start to fade. After the solvency 
condition is imposed in year 5, the income tax rate is increased, which reduces after-tax 
income. This contributes to a lower domestic demand and imports. This contractive 
effect dominates the fall in exports, as shown by the improvement of the trade balance. 
 
A mirror image is found for the isolated increase in the VAT rate (see green lines). On 
impact, the nominal wage increases as a reaction to the lower real wages. The higher 
production costs reduce production, employment and capacity utilization. Real 
consumption decreases on impact due to higher consumer prices and lower 
employment. The loss in domestic demand cuts imports but at the same time exports 
fall due to the higher export prices. The first of these reactions is much larger and the 
trade balance improves. The higher VAT revenues improve the public balance, even 
though economic activity slows down. The capacity utilization and unemployment 
effects eventually curb the nominal wages and real producer wages fall towards the 
initial level. Imposing the solvency condition lowers the income tax rate after year 5, 
which raises after-tax incomes and stimulates domestic demand and production. 
Employment and unemployment converge to the initial level. The improvement of the 
external position fades away since imports increase more than exports.  
 
Roughly speaking, the effect of the full tax reform equals the sum over the effects of its 
two components (see purple lines). The expansionary effects of the SSC cut are larger 
and therefore drive the direction of the total effects.44 In sum, fiscal devaluation causes 
in the short run lower labour costs, a higher GDP, higher employment, lower 
unemployment, higher consumption and a marginally larger trade deficit.45 
 
                                                     
43The estimation of the import and export equations is explained in Barrell et al. (2007). The hypothesis of 
common long-run elasticities is not rejected for import demand. The estimated value of the long-run 
elasticity to total final expenditures equals 1.5 and the elasticity to the relative import price equals –0.2 
for all countries (Table II.7). The short-run elasticity to total expenditures is country-specific but is larger 
than 2 for the 4 countries. The long-run price elasticity of the export volume varies over the countries. 
For France it equals -0.5 (Table II.9). Finally, notice that the trade balance effect includes the effect on 
the denominator (GDP). 
44 See also Box IV.3.1 in EC (2008). 
45According to an uncovered interest parity condition, the increase in the nominal interest rate (after year 4) 
causes a depreciation of the euro (against the dollar) by 0.14% in the first year and by 0.22% in the ninth 
year. This depreciation contributes marginally to the improvement of competitiveness.  
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We want to discuss in more detail the finding that the trade balance worsens in the short 
run, since this opposes to results discussed in the ‘conventional’ literature. The different 
outcome is simply explained by the different quantification in the NiGEM model of the 
two opposing effects on the trade balance. On the one hand, fiscal devaluation 
stimulates net exports by reducing the relative price of the domestic good. On the other 
hand, it reduces net exports by the expansionary effects on domestic demand. The 
quantification of both effects in the NiGEM model is based on a careful estimation of 
an error correction specification of the export and import equation for each country (see 
Barrell et al., 2007). Estimation yields rather low price elasticities but high demand 
elasticities (see note 36). The values of the import elasticities to total expenditures are 
in particular large (exceeding 2 in the short run) when compared to parameterizations 
chosen in other simulation models. For example, the common specification of import 
demand in general equilibrium models implies a unitary elasticity. 
 
Regarding the comparisons with other studies based on model simulations, we next note 
that the short-run effects on the trade balance reported in the literature are positive but 
small (maximal 0.2% points of GDP, see Table 1 in IMF, 2012). The major exception 
are outcomes of the QUEST model in EC (2006, 2008), showing that shifting from 
labour to consumption taxation slightly weakens the short-run trade balance.46 It is 
remarkable that large effects (i.e. maximal 4% points of GDP in the first 3 years) are 
only found in the econometric studies of Franco (2011) and de Mooij and Keen (2012).  
 
Finally, we point at the uncertainties involved in assessing the effects. The effects on 
the trade balance not only measure the differences between effects on exports and 
imports, but also capture the different effects of increasing the VAT rate and decreasing 
the SSC rate. We therefore conclude that the sign of the short-run effect on the trade 
balance is uncertain but that its size likely is small. 
  
                                                     
46 EC (2008, p. 195) states “The gain in competitiveness that results from the labour tax reduction boosts 
exports. But the increase in domestic demand, in particular in consumption, also raises imports and the 
net outcome of these two opposing effects is typically a small worsening of the trade balance in the 
simulations”. 
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Figure 4.1.1: Fiscal devaluation in France – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
   
Employment     Unemployment rate 
   
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
   
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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IHS model 
Time paths for the main variables generated by the CGE model of IHS are presented in 
Figure 4.1.2.47 This model closes the government budget ex post by adjusting lump sum 
taxes, keeping public debt unaltered in each year. The value of public consumption is 
fixed, implying that its fraction in GDP varies. When comparing Figure 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, 
the pattern of the short-run effects is very comparable for most of the variables. 
However, effects are temporary in the NiGEM model, whereas the IHS model finds 
permanent, though small, effects. 
 
The dynamics, and even the order of magnitude, of the real producer wage looks very 
similar in both models but the underlying channels are very different. In contrast to the 
NiGEM model, wage rigidities are not incorporated in the IHS model. Instead, the 
transition path of the wage in the latter model is explained by the delayed adjustment of 
the capital stock and labour supply. First, capital adjustment costs make large, annual 
changes of the capital stock unattractive. Second, labour supply effects in the IHS 
model capture effects on participation (entry and exit), hours supplied and search efforts 
by unemployed. Aggregate effects consist of age-composition and skill-composition 
effects. A reform that shifts the tax burden partially from workers to non-workers 
increases the real consumer wage. Higher wages make working more attractive and 
induce more job search efforts. Current older generations hardly change labour supply 
following the reform. As older generations are gradually replaced by young 
generations, aggregate labour supply reacts with a delay. On impact, the capital stock 
adjusts less than employment. An increase in employment then reduces the marginal 
product of labour, which drives down the wage cost. The opposite holds when 
employment falls (e.g. in the VAT scenario). As capital accumulates, the wage 
converges to its long-run level. Since the long-run capital cost is not affected, the 
capital/labour ratio returns to its initial level. 
 
The figure also shows that fiscal devaluation has a permanent, beneficial effect on 
GDP, employment and unemployment. We discuss two main causes (see Section 2). 
First, without indexation of the social transfers, the wage cost remains below its initial 
level. In the case of the lower SSC rate, the wedge between the value of working and 
the value of non-working increases, which raises the search intensity and lowers the 
equilibrium unemployment. The VAT hike lowers the return on searching and increases 
equilibrium unemployment. The net effect of fiscal devaluation is a fall in long-run 
unemployment. Second, existing generations have to pay higher VAT taxes on their 
                                                     
47The variables in this Figure are defined as follows. Real GDP, expressed as % deviation from the 
baseline, is measured in constant consumer prices (To be precise, it equals output measured in constant 
producer prices plus taxes on final consumption, using the pre-reform VAT rate). Changes in the ratio 
Consumption/GDP are expressed in % points, where real consumption is measured in producer prices 
(without taxes). Material balance holds after adding taxes to consumption, i.e. the sum of the changes in 
private consumption, public consumption, investment and net exports equals zero. 
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asset holdings, whereas they do not profit (or profit less) from the lower SSC rate. 
Future generations benefit from this windfall as they need to pay lower lump sum taxes 
(-10%). In contrast to the NiGEM results, consumption falls during the first (25) years. 
Older, current generations are harmed by the higher VAT rate, while they benefit less 
from the lower SSC rate. As a result, they can afford a lower level of consumption. 
With the growth of income, consumption finally increases above its initial level.  
 
The IHS model has a single, tradable good with a fixed producer price. With 
competitiveness effects, we here mean that, at the pre-shock level of employment, fiscal 
devaluation reduces the real wage cost relative to the marginal productivity of labour. 
This induces an expansion of employment until the ratio is restored. The extra output 
can be exported at a constant price. Initially, the fall in consumption contributes to the 
increase of net exports. Over time, imports pick up with consumption and the trade 
balance eventually deteriorates.48 
  
                                                     
48 Following the intertemporal budget constraint of the economy, the value of the starting stock of net 
foreign assets equals the sum of the present value of all trade balance surpluses and deficits. In other 
words, current improvements should be compensated by future deteriorations of the trade balance. 
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Figure 4.1.2: Fiscal devaluation in France – IHS 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption (%GDP)    Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline for the first 3 figures, % point difference for 
the last three. 
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CEPII model 
In the CGE model of CEPII lump sum transfers are adjusted to keep the fiscal deficit 
(as % of GDP) unchanged in each year (as in the IHS model). Figure 4.1.3 shows the 
simulation outcomes of the CEPII model. The effects of the reforms on output and 
labour markets are very similar to the findings of the IHS model. Following the 
estimated wage setting equation, fiscal devaluation reduces permanently real labour 
costs. The resulting increase in labour demand contributes to the expansion of GDP. 
With a fixed labour supply, the increase in employment comes about by a reduction in 
unemployment. 
 
The consequences for consumption and the trade balance differ between both models. 
The IHS model found an increase of consumption by 0.1% point of GDP in the long 
run, which was mirrored by an equal reduction of net exports. These GDP shares are 
hardly affected in the CEPII simulations: consumption ultimately falls by only 0.01% 
while the trade balance slightly improves by 0.03%. These differences in outcomes can 
be explained by differences in model features. First, the IHS model considers 
overlapping generations (with finite lives), allowing for dynamics driven by 
intergenerational heterogeneity. The CEPII model specifies one representative 
household, meaning that higher ex post tax revenues are distributed as lump sum 
transfers to the same household. Second, households in the IHS model feature forward-
looking optimising behaviour (including labour supply). In the CEPII model 
consumption spending is a constant fraction of disposable income and labour supply is 
fixed. Third, the IHS model considers a fixed interest rate and a fixed commodity price. 
The CEPII model includes an endogenous interest rate and endogenous terms of trade. 
 
In the remainder of this section, we discuss some sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 4.1.3: Fiscal devaluation in France – CEPII 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
 
Employment     Unemployment rate 
 
Consumption (%GDP)    Trade balance (%GDP) 
 
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline for the first 3 figures, % point 
difference for the last three. 
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Sensitivity to price indexation of social transfers 
Next to the baseline without price indexation, we simulate with the IHS model 50% and 
100% indexation of social transfers. Figure 4.1.4 confirms that the effects on GDP are 
very sensitive to the degree of price indexation. When social transfers are partially or 
fully linked to the consumer price, the reservation wage of the workers will be higher. 
Furthermore, the increase in outlays on social transfers is financed by a higher lump 
sum tax. In contrast to the baseline, full indexation leads to higher labour costs and 
lower employment in each year. As a consequence, GDP is hardly stimulated in the 
long run (as already indicated by the discussion in Section 2.5). In the case with 
indexation, the fall in exports, due to the higher production costs, is offset by the fall in 
imports, following the reduction of consumption (relative to the base case without 
indexation). Therefore, net exports are not much affected by the indexation rule (as a 
fraction of GDP).  
Figure 4.1.4: Sensitivity to the degree of price indexation in France – IHS 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
  
The indexation rules of transfers in the NiGEM model affect the results through a 
completely different channel. In this model, transfers are indexed to changes in the 
wage bill but receiving transfers is not conditional on not being employed. In the base 
case, transfers are partially linked to wage bill changes (coefficient equals 0.25). In an 
alternative scenario, we consider full indexation by increasing the coefficient to 1. 
Figure 4.1.5 shows that the higher transfer outlays in the alternative scenario, initially 
financed by a larger government deficit, have a large expansionary effect on GDP. The 
extra output gains are more driven by demand than by supply factors in this case. After 
the increase in the wage bill slows down and consolidation starts by increasing the 
income tax rate, the difference with the baseline quickly falls. The development of the 
trade balance is opposed to the GDP effects: the larger the expansion of GDP the more 
the trade balance weakens (as %GDP). 
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Figure 4.1.5: Sensitivity to indexing transfers to wages in France – NiGEM 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
  
Sensitivity to alternative budget closure 
In the baseline of IHS the budget is closed ex post by changing lump sum taxes. The 
following ex-ante closure scenario is applied: 
 For the first 40 years, lump sum taxes are kept constant and the fiscal balance and 
thus public debt are allowed to vary unrestricted. 
 Between years 41 and 80, the lump sum tax is changed so that there is a linear 
change in public debt. 
 From year 81, the public debt is kept constant at its initial level by adjusting lump 
sum taxes. 
 
Notice that the long-run outcomes are identical in both scenarios, because public debt 
becomes ultimately the same. To understand differences in the transition path, 
remember that fiscal devaluation leads to an expansion of the economy. In the ex-post 
scenario, this allows an immediate reduction of lump sum taxes, or raise in lump sum 
transfers, while this is postponed till year 41 in the ex-ante scenario. As a consequence, 
generations living during the first 40 years benefit less, or even do not benefit, from 
lower lump sum taxes. These generations have to reduce consumption and leisure. The 
marginal increase in aggregate labour supply leads to a slightly large output at producer 
prices. GDP measured at consumer prices is lower than in the ex-post scenario, due to 
the lower consumption tax revenues (see Figure 4.1.6). After the deferred adjustment of 
lump sum taxes, consumption and GDP pick up and exceed the benchmark level till the 
long run. The change in the consumption path is reflected in the deviations of the trade 
balance. Larger relative increases in net exports during the first years make room for 
larger decreases during later years.  
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Partial
Full -0.18
-0.15
-0.12
-0.09
-0.06
-0.03
0.00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Partial
Full
58 
TAXUD/2011/DE/338 
 
Figure 4.1.6: Sensitivity to budget closure in France – IHS 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
  
Sensitivity to targeted reduction of SSC 
The IHS model considers three types of workers with different skill levels. This allows 
analyzing a scenario in which the SSC reduction is targeted at the low-skilled workers 
(A reduction by 1% of ex ante GDP is obtained by decreasing the firm’s rate from 32% 
to 19% for 30% of the workers). The effects on production and wages crucially hinge 
on the specification of the substitution possibilities between the different labour types in 
production. This model assumes capital-skill complementarity, meaning that low-
skilled workers can be substituted more easily by capital than medium and high-skilled 
workers. Wages per skill level are bargained between workers and firms. 
 
The results show a channel that is not covered in the literature survey. The targeted 
reduction indeed achieves an expansion of the employment of low-skilled workers, but 
this is going at the expense of employment of the other workers (see the lines with 
markers in the right panel of Figure 4.1.8).49 Medium and high-skilled workers reduce 
labour supply since they only suffer from the reform (the VAT increase). Replacing 
high productive workers by low productive workers reduces the average productivity, 
which is reflected by an ultimate fall of GDP (see Figure 4.1.7). The larger initial 
expansion of GDP is combined with more beneficial effects on the trade balance but 
these switches into more adverse effects in later years. 
                                                     
49 The expansion of low-skilled employment by 2.6% on impact might be unrealistic, showing that the 
short-run effects are less relevant in this model. 
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Figure 4.1.7: Sensitivity to targeted reduction of SSC in France – IHS 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
  
Figure 4.1.8: Sensitivity of consumption (left) and employment (right) of different skill 
levels to targeted reduction of SSC in France – IHS 
 
We use this scenario to discuss the distributional consequences of the reform on the 
three skill levels. Figure 4.1.8 illustrates the distributional effects by way of annual 
changes in average consumption. The overlapping full lines refer to the base scenario in 
which the cut in the SSC rate applies to all workers. It shows that consumption of the 
three types of workers is almost identically affected. Small differences can be attributed 
to the feature that the SSC rate and the labour tax rate increase with income, while the 
VAT rate is flat. In contrast, the dotted lines reveal that distributional effects differ 
widely if the reform focuses on low-skilled workers. Average consumption strongly 
increases for low-skilled workers whereas it decreases for the other workers.51 A more 
detailed distributional analysis using a microsimulation model will be described below. 
                                                     
51 Welfare effects correct for changes in leisure.  
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Sensitivity to wage rigidity 
We first use simulations with the NiGEM model to illustrate the sensitivity to the wage 
formation. In the base case, wages strongly depend on the unemployment rate lagged 
one quarter. We increase the lag to 4 quarters in an alternative scenario, i.e. the wages 
start to react to unemployment only after one year. If the reduction in SSC rate and hike 
in VAT rate is studied separately, it turns out that the longer lag has opposite effects on 
nominal wages, employment and GPD. The rigidity of wages keeps the nominal wage 
rate low longer in case of SSC reduction, and correspondingly, it supports the higher 
wages in case of VAT hike. As a net outcome, GDP initially expands marginally more 
and the trade balance marginally worsens (see Figure 4.1.9). In later years, the real 
producer wage converges faster to its initial level, which leads to a smaller GDP 
increase and a larger trade balance improvement in comparison to the baseline. 
Figure 4.1.9: Sensitivity to wage rigidity in France – NiGEM 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
  
With the CEPII model, we compare a scenario with a perfectly competitive labour 
market to the base scenario. The wage rate in the baseline is determined by negotiations 
between labour unions and employers, leading to equilibrium unemployment. In an 
alternative scenario we model a perfectly competitive labour market with flexible 
wages (the unemployment rate is kept constant at the level in the base year). Since the 
reduction of the SSC rate is uniform for all workers in all sectors, it has no real effects 
with perfectly flexible wages and fixed labour supply. In contrast, increasing sector-
specific VAT rates by the same percentage changes the relative output prices. As a 
consequence, the effect on aggregate GDP depends on the reallocation of production 
factors over the sectors. Figure 4.1.10 shows that GDP is slightly reduced when wages 
are perfectly flexible. It clearly illustrates that fiscal devaluation is only effective in the 
presence of labour market distortions. Real consumption falls but less than GDP. The 
fall in exports and the rise of imports now leads to a small deterioration of the trade 
balance (in %GDP). 
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Figure 4.1.10: Sensitivity to flexibility of wages in France – CEPII 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
  
Sensitivity to trade elasticities 
From the literature survey we concluded that simulation results are rather insensitive to 
the values of the trade elasticities (section 2.9). We simulate the same tax reform with 
the NiGEM model after doubling the price elasticity in the export demand equation. As 
expected, exports now benefit more from the fall in its relative price, which contributes 
to an improvement of the trade balance and GDP during the first years when compared 
to the base case (see Figure 4.1.11). As the gain in competitiveness is only temporary, 
both GDP and the trade balance are lowered in later years (relative to base case). The 
small differences confirm that outcomes are robust to the price elasticity of exports, in 
particular the finding that fiscal devaluation has unfavourable effects on the trade 
balance position. 
 
The sensitivity in the longer run is illustrated with outcomes of the CEPII model. The 
sector-specific price elasticity of export demand (or the Armington substitution 
elasticity) ranges from 1.1 to 5.1 in the baseline (in absolute value). In the alternative 
scenario we halve these elasticity values. When exports respond less elastic to a lower 
price, GDP is less stimulated by the tax reform (see Figure 4.1.12). The smaller 
increase of exports is compensated by a larger fall of imports, implying a larger 
improvement of the trade balance (relative to the base case). We again find that the 
outcomes hardly differ between both sets of export elasticities.52 
                                                     
52Notice that this sensitivity analysis cannot be performed with the IHS model since it considers one 
homogenous good (in other words, domestic and foreign goods are assumed perfect substitutes). 
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Figure 4.1.11: Sensitivity to doubling the price elasticity of exports in France – NiGEM 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
  
Figure 4.1.12: Sensitivity to halving the price elasticity of exports in France – CEPII 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
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Summary 
Fiscal devaluation in France has a favourable impact on output and labour market 
outcomes in the short run according to the NiGEM model. Since fiscal devaluation 
implies a shift in taxation from workers to non-workers (i.e. transfer recipients and 
capital income earners), the expansive effects of the SSC cut dominate the contractive 
effects of the VAT hike. Given the rigid nominal wage, it achieves a temporary 
reduction in real labour costs, which results in a higher employment and a lower 
unemployment (with a constant labour supply). At the same time, consumer prices fall 
(i.e. producer prices fall more than VAT increases) and real consumer wages rise, 
leading to a higher consumption. In contrast to other studies, NiGEM finds a (slight) 
worsening of the trade balance in every year. According to the NiGEM estimates, the 
favourable effects arising from the improvement in the competitive position are offset 
by the increase in imports following the expansion of domestic demand. As the nominal 
wage is gradually increased, the expansionary effects fade away over time. 
 
Long-run effects are illustrated using the CGE models of IHS and CEPII. Both models 
find a permanent, though small, positive effect on employment and GDP. We identify 
two main channels in the IHS model. First, the bargained wage is permanently lowered 
because the outside option of the workers deteriorates when social transfers are not 
indexed to the higher consumer prices. Second, the IHS model incorporates that the 
incidence differs over the generations. Shifting from wage to consumption taxes implies 
a redistribution from current to future generations. Existing generations have to pay 
unexpectedly higher VAT taxes, while they benefit less from the lower SSC rate. This 
is mirrored by lower tax payments over the lifetime of future generations. As a 
consequence, long-run consumption increases while the trade balance worsens. The 
CEPII model finds similar effects as the IHS model, except for small differences for the 
consumption and trade balance effects. 
 
The sensitivity analysis for France is summarized in Table 4.1.2. In line with the 
literature, we find that the GDP effects are very sensitive to the degree of price 
indexation of social transfers (IHS). GDP outcomes are in particular sensitive to 
targeting the SSC reduction to low-skilled workers, due to a channel that is 
underexposed in the literature (IHS). The expansion of the employment of low-skilled 
workers is achieved at the expense of employment of the other workers. Replacing high 
productive workers by low productive workers leads ultimately to a fall of GDP. Next, 
effects are only marginally affected by increasing the degree of wage rigidity (NiGEM), 
but fiscal devaluation is not effective in a perfectly competitive labour market (CEPII). 
Finally, results are robust to values of the trade elasticities (NiGEM, CEPII). 
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Table 4.1.1: Summary of fiscal devaluation in France 
 SR max.** (NiGEM) LR (IHS) LR (CEPII) 
Real producer wage -0.70% -0.07% -0.08% 
Real GDP 0.17% 0.09% 0.20% 
Employment 0.70% 0.08% 0.30% 
Unemployment rate* -0.60% -0.04% -0.26% 
Consumption (LR*) 0.31% 0.09% -0.01% 
Trade balance (%GDP)* -0.09% -0.09% 0.03% 
* % point difference; ** maximum effect (in absolute value) during first 9 years 
Table 4.1.2: Sensitivity analysis for France 
 GDP TB (%GDP) 
NiGEM  1y 9y 1y 9y 
Basecase 0.01% 0.17% -0.02% -0.09% 
Indexation 0.03% 0.19% -0.04% -0.12% 
Wage rigidity 0.01% 0.16% -0.03% -0.10% 
Export elasticity 0.02% 0.15% -0.01% -0.10% 
     
IHS SR LR SR LR  
Basecase 0.01% 0.09% 0.17% -0.09% 
Indexation -0.05% 0.01% 0.19% -0.07% 
Ex ante budget closure -0.03% 0.09% 0.35% -0.09% 
Targeted SSC 0.20% -0.24% 0.34% -0.08% 
      
CEPII SR LR SR LR 
Basecase 0.14% 0.20% 0.01% 0.03% 
Wage rigidity -0.03% -0.05% -0.02% -0.02% 
Export elasticity 0.14% 0.19% 0.02% 0.03% 
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4.2 Micro simulations for France 
The microsimulations of the distributive impact of FD have been performed using the 
SYSIFF 2006 tax-benefit model (developed by Microsimula – UIB). It uses 2006 
household budget data for France (Budget des Familles, BDF 2006), with 10229 
households. Though the main objective of this survey is the study of the consumption 
patterns of households, there is extensive information on family characteristics and job 
conditions of the individuals, as well as very detailed income information. This allows 
SYSIFF 2006 to model extensively most part of social contributions (for employers, 
employee and self employed), special contributions, income tax (including most tax 
credits and deductions), local taxes (for each municipality) and social benefits 
(including minimum income, housing benefit, children and family allowances, 
schooling benefits, and so on). The data base is very rich and no matching is necessary 
in order to perform the simulations. The fiscal year used in the simulation is 2006. 
Although 2008, and partially 2009, are available, the updating for these fiscal years is 
completely different from what proposed by this project. Hence, to avoid 
inconsistencies, the choice has been to simulate using 2006 data and then uprate 
everything according to the criteria of this project. The update was performed directly 
from within the microsimulation model using the last available official INSEE figure 
for the GDP and CPI. The last official common year is 2010.  
 
In France, in 2006, there were three VAT tax rates. The ordinary rate is 19.6% and 
includes clothing, furniture, equipment, housing products, communication, recreation, 
leisure, meals out of home, beauty and other goods (as aggregated in SYSIFF2006). 
The percentage of total expenditure taxed at 19.6% amounts to 50.1% of total 
expenditure. The reduced rate is 5.5%, and includes food, beverages, energy, transports, 
books (including newspapers, weekly publications, etc), cinema and museums. The 
percentage of total expenditure taxed at 5.5% amounts to 45.0%. There is a specially 
reduced rate of 2.1% for some very special goods categories (such as newspapers, TV 
licence fee, pharmaceuticals) that we do not model. These expenditures amount to 4.9% 
of the total expenditure. The latter tax rate is not changed in the scenario in which a 
uniform tax rate is introduced. In France social security contributions have a very 
important role in collecting resources for public finances, accounting for 16.4% of 
GDP. The contributive scheme is very complex and several contributions are collected 
with different aims (e.g. health, unemployment, widowhood, retirement, etc.). 
Employer social contributions are also used to finance family benefits, housing benefits, 
work injuries, in-work formation, etc. Several non-linearities arise from the system. The 
main source is the upper limit applied to many contributions, both for the employee and 
for the employer. Similar conditions apply to several different contributions. 
Progressivity in social contributions is introduced through the complementary pension 
payment, which is one of the largest forms of contribution. A reduced rate and a full 
rate exist, with the latter being almost three times higher. Also for this contribution an 
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upper limit exists. A special mention is due to two special contributions, CSG and 
CRDS. They are proportional contributions without upper limits and are paid at the 
same rate (with some exceptions, of course) for all sources of incomes (including 
income from capital and benefits). Differently from the other contributions, only a 
small part of their payment can be deduced from taxable income. 
 
For the sake of the reform scenarios, we applied a proportional reduction to all 
(employer) contributions in order to make the VAT reform revenue neutral, without 
differences among the various rates. Two scenarios were developed. In the first one the 
reduction applied to all workers, and therefore is rather modest. In the second one the 
reduction is applied only to low income workers and hence it is more substantial. 
1 Increase only in the standard VAT rate 
In this first subsection we show the distributive impact of a fiscal devaluation financed 
by an increase only in the standard rate of VAT, which in France is set at 19.6%. There 
are two sub-cases. In the first one, the SSC rates on all workers are reduced by 6.6%53. 
Then the standard VAT rate is increased by 17.1% of its amount, i.e. from 19.6% to 
23%, in order to close the budget. In the second case, we decrease SSC rates only for 
low earners by 39.6% (still corresponding, from the macro model, to 1% of GDP), 
compute the total cost of this reform after the changes in the other schemes of the tax-
benefit system, and increase the standard VAT rate by the necessary amount to balance 
the budget.  
 
The FD produces an increase in disposable income through the reduction in SSC rates, 
but also a greater VAT burden. Figure 4.2.1 shows these different effects for the case in 
which all rates of SSC are reduced by the same percentage, taken from the macro 
model. In this and all other similar graphs, the burden of VAT change on income or 
expenditure is represented with negative numbers, so as to clearly distinguish this 
change (a reduction in actual disposable income) from the increase in income arising 
from the reduction in SSC. The VAT burden rises for all deciles more or less by the 
same amount, around 1% of disposable income, but the increase in average disposable 
income of the poorest decile is negligible, while the richest ones get a substantial 
benefit. The result (the line with white dots) is a regressive effect, whereby “net” 
disposable income (disposable income minus the increase in the amount paid in VAT) 
rises for the three richest deciles and falls for the first six deciles. Consequently, the 
Gini index of the disposable equivalent income distribution rises from 0.29014 (the 
baseline value) to 0.29208, i.e. by 0.67%. 
                                                     
53 This is equivalent to saying, as already stressed, that the total revenue from social security contributions 
falls by 6.6%. 
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Figure 4.2.1: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in France – decrease in all SSC rates  
 
 
When only the SSC for low-paid workers are cut (Figure 4.2.2), then the increase in 
disposable income before VAT is higher in the bottom half of the population, while the 
burden of the higher VAT is spread uniformly in relative terms. Notice that the increase 
in the burden of VAT is much lower than in the previous case. The main reason for this 
difference lays in the strong reduction in public expenditure for cash benefits after the 
increase in the incomes of poor workers. Also, the revenue of the personal income tax 
rises, in part because of the effect of the mechanism of the family quotient. So, budget 
neutrality can be obtained with a small increase in the VAT rate (from 19.6% to 
20.1%). The presence of a complex set of tax-benefit instruments, affecting the 
structure of the budget constraint in particular for low incomes, may also explain why 
the percentage increase in income has a non linear pattern across deciles. For example, 
for very low incomes the gain following the reduction in SSC is almost completely 
offset by the reduction in some benefits that have a very high withdrawal rate. For 
earnings around 1000 euros per month, a greater income is followed by an increase in 
the Prime pour l’employ, so net income could increase by more than the reduction in 
contributions. For higher incomes, a greater income is followed by a reduction in this 
benefit and therefore by a possibly marginal increase in net income. To understand all 
these changes in detail, therefore, it would be necessary to analyse the whole structure 
of the French tax-benefit system54. The net result is a very slightly progressive change 
in “net” disposable income across deciles, with the poorest two and the middle three 
deciles gaining a bit from the reform, and the richest two slightly losing. Notice that 
also the richest deciles are partly beneficiaries of an increase in income: the deciles are 
defined on households and on household incomes, not on individuals, and there are 
                                                     
54 To partially correct for the presence of strong poverty traps, the Revenue minimum d’insertion, which 
had a withdrawal rate of 100%, has been replaced in 2009 by the Revenue de solidarité active, with much 
smaller withdrawal rates.  
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some low earners who live in affluent families. The moderate progressivity of this case 
is confirmed by the change in the Gini index, which falls from its baseline value of 
0.29014 to 0.2891, i.e. a reduction by -0.36%. The two curves with the final change in 
disposable income are repeated in Figure 4.2.3, so as to highlight the differences 
between the two cases. 
Figure 4.2.2: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in France – decrease in SSC rates only for low incomes  
 
Figure 4.2.3: Change in disposable income after FD in France by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
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If we evaluate the distributive impact of the FD not on the income deciles but across 
equivalent expenditure deciles, the results of Figure 4.2.3 are confirmed (Figure 4.2.4): 
the FD is regressive if it is extended to all employees (the Gini index in this case rises 
from 0.38372 to 0.38456 (+0.22%)), it is slightly progressive if it is concentrated only 
on low incomes, with a corresponding reduction of the Gini index to 0.38284 (-0.23%). 
Figure 4.2.4: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in France by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
 
 
The results by family type (Figure 4.2.5) show that if the reduction of SSC is extended 
to all workers the greatest beneficiaries are households with children, even if the 
average gain is very low, while the greatest burden is on the elderly. If we change only 
SSC on low-paid workers, the effect is much more neutral across family types, since the 
reduction in various transfers reduces the net gain in many incomes, and the required 
increase in VAT rates to close the budget is low. 
Figure 4.2.5: Change in disposable income after FD in France by family type  
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The analysis by condition of the head (Figure 4.2.6) confirms this distributional pattern: 
with SSC reduction extended to all employees, the biggest gainers are households of 
non manual workers and managers, and the biggest losers are the pensioners and the 
unemployed, as well as the independent workers. When the SSC reduction is targeted to 
low incomes, then only the families of manual workers and of the unemployed seem to 
gain a bit, while for the other groups the change is barely significant.  
Figure 4.2.6: Change in disposable income after FD in France by condition of the 
household head  
 
 
2 Proportional increase in all VAT rates  
In this case all VAT rates are increased by the same proportion so as to close the public 
budget. The new VAT rates are set at 6% and 21.4% (increasing by 9%) if the SSC 
reduction is extended to all employees, and at 5.6% and 20.1% (increasing by 2.4%) if 
it is targeted to low earners only. The distributional effects of FD by deciles of income 
or expenditure are very similar to those of the previous case: clearly regressive with 
general reduction in SSC, with an increase in the Gini index to 0.29255, i.e. by 0.73%, 
very slightly progressive with SSC reduction concentrated on low incomes, with  a 
reduction in the Gini index by -0.22%, to 0.28928. We therefore do not make new 
comments on them. The reduction of SSC only on low incomes seems able, as in the 
case before, both to improve the conditions of low-income households with children 
and to preserve the elderly from a significant loss of income.  
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Figure 4.2.7: Change in disposable income after FD in France by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
 
Figure 4.2.8: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in France by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
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Figure 4.2.9: Change in disposable income after FD in France by family type  
 
 
Figure 4.2.10: Change in disposable income after FD in France by condition of the 
household head  
 
3 Uniform VAT rate 
If the public balance is closed with a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services 
(keeping current exemptions), then the FD is regressive even if the reduction in SSC is 
concentrated on low earnings, and also if the incidence is measured on (yearly) 
consumption. With general SSC reduction (new uniform VAT rate at 11.4%), the 
increase in disposable income is negligible for the lowest deciles, while it is significant 
for the richest ones. On the other hand, the new VAT would increase its burden on the 
lowest two deciles by more than 1.7%, but only by 0.4% on the richest one, so that the 
net effect of both changes is markedly regressive. Indeed, the Gini index of the 
equivalent income distribution rises by 2.03%, i.e. from 0.29014 to 0.2960. In the 
equivalent expenditure distribution, the Gini rises by 1.38%. 
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However, the effect would remain regressive also in the case of a SSC reduction 
concentrated on low incomes (new uniform VAT rate at 10.8%), because the VAT 
change would remain strongly regressive, while the SSC change would have a modestly 
progressive impact.  
Figure 4.2.11: Change in disposable income after FD in France by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
The regressive picture is confirmed across the equivalent expenditure deciles (Figure 
4.2.12): with general SSC reduction, the increase in expenditure is nearly zero for the 
lowest deciles but significant for the richest section of the distribution, while the new 
uniform VAT rate has a clearly regressive impact. As in the previous graph, the 
reduction of SSC only on low incomes manages only to attenuate a bit the regressivity 
of this reform. 
 
That a move towards a uniform VAT rate can have a regressive impact is not an 
unexpected result (IFS et al., 2011). This effect, however, does not mean that a FD 
cannot be financed with a uniform VAT rate. A government concerned about the 
increase in inequality could, for instance, set the new uniform VAT rate at a higher 
level than that necessary to close the budget, and use the extra-revenue to finance a cash 
transfer targeted to poor households.  
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Figure 4.2.12: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in France by deciles of 
equivalent disposable expenditure 
 
 
The reform would particularly hurt the households of pensioners, in both versions, 
while the effect on families with children would be modest. The lower additional 
burden would be on families that consume goods and services already taxed at the 
standard rate, i.e. non manual workers and managers.  
Figure 4.2.13: Change in disposable income after FD in France by family type  
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Figure 4.2.14: Change in disposable income after FD in France by condition of the 
household head  
 
Indexation of benefits in France 
We next compare the distributive effects of the FD in France with and without the 
indexation of cash benefits (by 0.5%-0.85% according to the various hypotheses 
concerning the changes in VAT rates). In France all major monetary benefits are 
indexed to the price level. The curves associated to the no-indexation case are the same 
already presented above. All three alternative cases of modifications of the VAT rates 
show a similar pattern: the indexation of benefits has a detectable effect for the poorest 
deciles, always reducing, as expected, their loss, or increasing their benefit. This effect 
is particularly clear in the case of a uniform VAT rate, where the negative net incidence 
for the first decile is reduced from -2.6% to -1.8% of disposable income. In this third 
case, the targeted reduction of SSC actually turns the FD from regressive to slightly 
progressive.  
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Figure 4.2.15: France: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without 
indexation of benefits 
Figure 4.2.16: France: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
all VAT rates, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of 
benefits 
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Figure 4.2.17: France: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform 
VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of 
benefits 
 
 
Table 4.2.1 compares the percentage changes in the Gini index for disposable 
equivalent income after the FD. All these numbers refer to the variation in the Gini 
index from the baseline income distribution before the fiscal devaluation. In nearly all 
the cases, the indexation of benefits reduces the increase in the Gini index, when the FD 
has a regressive impact, and produces a more significant fall in the inequality index 
when the effect of FD is progressive. The only case where there is a change in the sign 
of the distributive effect refers to the application of a uniform VAT rate accompanied 
by a reduction only on the SSC rates for low income workers: without indexation the 
impact is regressive, with indexation it becomes slightly progressive. We can therefore 
conclude that benefit indexation has a significant effect in reducing the negative 
distributive impact of the reform, even if it manages to turn its effect, from a regressive 
to a progressive one, in one case only. Benefit indexation has the effect of improving 
the conditions of the poorest deciles.  
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Table 4.2.1: France: percentage variation in the Gini index for equivalent disposable 
income after the FD, with and without indexation of cash benefits 
 Without benefit 
indexation 
With benefit 
indexation 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate   
1.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.67% +0.49% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low  incomes  -0.36% -0.53% 
   
2 Increase in all VAT rates   
2.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.73% +0.49% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.30% -0.52% 
   
3 Uniform VAT rate   
3.1 change in all SSC rates  +2.03% +0.70% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
+0.99% -0.29% 
Note: percentage changes of the Gini index with respect to the baseline case of the distribution of 
disposable income before the fiscal devaluation. 
 
The three figures that follow show that the indexation of benefits is, in some cases, able 
to change the pattern of the distributive results with respect to the no-indexation case. In 
particular, indexation seems to be particularly helpful, as expected, for households of 
pensioners and unemployed persons.  
Figure 4.2.18: France: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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Figure 4.2.19: France: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
all VAT rates, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
Figure 4.2.20: France: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform 
VAT rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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5 Simulations of unilateral fiscal devaluation in Italy 
5.1 Macro simulations for Italy 
The effects of the base case reforms in Italy simulated by the NiGEM model are 
presented in Figure 5.1.1.55 When compared to the results obtained for France (Figure 
4.1.1), we observe similar developments but the labour market outcomes (i.e. real 
producer wage, employment and unemployment) are found to stabilise much earlier. 
This reflects that the nominal wage is estimated to adjust more rapidly in Italy than in 
France. Its half-life adjustment is 4.3 years in Italy, compared to 7.3 years in France. 
After 9 years, fiscal devaluation stimulates GDP and private consumption twice as 
much in Italy as in France. In view of the larger estimated value of the long-run price 
elasticity of exports (1.0 versus 0.5 for France), the trade balance improves in the first 
three years. However, the fast convergence of production costs and the expansion of 
consumption contribute to an ultimate worsening of the trade balance by 0.4% of 
GDP.56 
 
Comparison of the CGE simulations by the IHS model between Italy (Figure 5.1.2) and 
France (Figure 4.1.2) shows that both pattern and size of the effects are very similar. In 
the long run, employment in persons increase by 0.11% in Italy (0.08% in France) and 
GDP expands by 0.10% in Italy (0.09% in France). The small differences can be 
explained by a combination of skill composition effects and the progressivity of the 
SSC system. SSC are very progressive in France but proportional in Italy. The 
reduction of the SSC rate stimulates labour supply of all workers in Italy but it mostly 
affects labour supply of the high-skilled workers in France. The number of persons 
employed increases more in Italy, but after correcting for productivity, the effect on 
employment and hence on GDP is similar in both countries.  
  
                                                     
55 When in the following sections results are similar to the ones found for France, we will not repeat the full 
explanations. We refer to Section 4.1 for the detailed discussion of the basic channels in each model. In 
the discussion of the findings for the remaining countries, we focus on the interpretation of main 
differences. 
56 The rate of depreciation of the euro ranges from 0.12% in the first year to 0.26% in the ninth year in this 
case. 
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Figure 5.1.1: Fiscal devaluation in Italy – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
  
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Soc
Vat
Both
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Soc
Vat
Both
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Soc
Vat
Both
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Soc
Vat
Both
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Soc
Vat
Both
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Soc
Vat
Both
83 
Study on fiscal devaluation 
 
Figure 5.1.2: Fiscal devaluation in Italy – IHS 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption (%GDP)    Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline for the first 3 figures, % point difference for 
the last three. 
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Sensitivity 
The sensitivity analysis is summarized in Table 5.1.1. The upper part of the table shows 
that the outcomes of the NiGEM model are not sensitive to full indexation of transfers, 
at least in the first and last year after the policy change.57 Outcomes in every year are 
robust to doubling the value of the price elasticity of exports.58 The lower part confirms 
that for the IHS model long-run GDP is sensitive to indexing social transfers and to 
targeted SSC reduction whereas the effect on the trade balance ratio remains rather 
robust. It is interesting to note that long-run GDP in Italy is less sensitive to the degree 
of indexation compared to France. The reason is that social security insurance is less 
generous in Italy; for instance, the replacement rate for unemployment benefits is 
roughly half the replacement rate in France. The degree of indexation matters less when 
social transfers are low relative to wages.  
Table 5.1.1: Sensitivity analysis for Italy 
  GDP  TB (%GDP) 
NiGEM 1y 9y 1y 9y 
Basecase 0.01% 0.36% 0.02% -0.39% 
Indexation 0.02% 0.39% 0.01% -0.50% 
Export elasticity 0.02% 0.35% 0.02% -0.40% 
     
IHS SR LR SR LR 
Basecase 0.08% 0.10% 0.15% -0.05% 
Indexation 0.04% 0.02% 0.12% -0.02% 
Ex ante budget closure 0.04% 0.10% 0.33% -0.05% 
Targeted SSC 0.22% -0.35% 0.29% -0.09% 
Summary 
The NiGEM and IHS results for Italy are similar to the ones discussed for France 
(Table 5.1.2). The fall of the real producer wage in the NiGEM model has favourable 
effects on GDP and labour market outcomes. Due to a rapid adjustment of the nominal 
wage, labour market outcomes already stabilize after a couple of years. The trade 
balance improves slightly during the first years following the better competitive 
position but worsens in later years after the expansion of domestic demand.  
 
The IHS model finds again a small increase in long-run employment and GDP, while 
the trade balance is slightly weakened. The main channels are the depressing effect of 
lower non-indexed social transfers on wage costs and the implied redistribution in 
favour of future generations. The NIGEM results are not sensitive to the value of the 
                                                     
57 Remember that changes in transfers do not (directly) affect the outside option of workers in the NiGEM 
model. 
58 Sensitivity analysis with respect to the wage setting is not reported because this scenario did not 
converge for Italy. 
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price elasticity of exports, while the GDP effects of IHS are sensitive to the indexation 
of social transfers and to targeted SSC reduction (Table 5.1.1). 
Table 5.1.2: Summary of fiscal devaluation in Italy 
 SR max.** (NiGEM) LR (IHS) 
Real producer wage -1.00% -0.04% 
Real GDP 0.36% 0.10% 
Employment 0.74% 0.11% 
Unemployment rate* -0.56% -0.03% 
Consumption (LR*) 1.27% 0.07% 
Trade balance (%GDP)* -0.39% -0.05% 
* % point difference; ** maximum effect (in absolute value) during first 9 years 
5.2 Micro simulations for Italy 
The analysis of the distributive impact of FD has been performed with a tax-benefit 
microsimulation model (Mapp, Model for the Analysis of Public Policies) for Italy, 
maintained at the Department of Economics of the University of Modena and Reggio 
Emilia59. The source of household micro-data is a hybrid dataset which uses information 
from both the 2008 EU-SILC survey for Italy (which has a sample size of 20982 
households and contains information on incomes perceived during 2007) and the 2007 
household budget survey (Indagine sui Consumi delle Famiglie, ICF), which has a 
sample size of 24400 households. The EU-SILC dataset provides the core data used to 
simulate direct taxes and income transfers, whilst the ICF provides a detailed 
breakdown of expenditure by category that allows highly accurate modelling of the 
VAT treatment of different goods and services. We have computed for each household 
the amount of VAT paid on 248 different categories of goods and services. Since the 
SILC survey does not contain spending data, we have imputed expenditures from the 
ISTAT ICF consumption survey of 2007 (which lacks information on income). In order 
to obtain a consistent relationship between total income and total expenditure, we have 
estimated this relationship using the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and 
Wealth for 2008, the only dataset in Italy containing data on both household disposable 
income and total consumption.60 The coefficients of this regression are then used to 
impute a total consumption value to the SILC households. The SILC households are 
then classified in deciles of total imputed consumption, and households belonging to 
each decile of imputed consumption are then matched61 with the households that belong 
                                                     
59 See, for recent applications, Baldini and Pacifico (2009) and Baldini and Poggio (2012). 
60 http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait. 
61 Using the Stata command psmatch2. Notice that in three out of four countries involved in this study it 
has been necessary to use data obtained after a matching of two different data sets. Since these matching 
processes have been independently performed by the various teams, the use of different matching 
procedures could make the comparative analysis more uncertain.  
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to the corresponding consumption decile in the ICF survey. This matching procedure is 
separately repeated for each of the 10 deciles. In the SILC survey, we have now a 
vector of 248 expenditures associated with each household, and also a reliable 
relationship between their sum and disposable income. The average consumption 
propensity in SILC is greater than that in the Bank of Italy survey since average 
expenditure in the ISTAT consumption survey is greater. Expenditures are uprated by 
the growth in nominal spending between 2007 and 2011 according to National 
Accounts, separately for nine categories of goods and services. Incomes are uprated 
using the growth in nominal GDP (per household) between 2007 and 2011. Employer 
social security contributions for each worker are not simulated but are taken from the 
SILC survey. Since the tax base (gross wages) does not change in our simulations, 
changing the SSC rates is equivalent to a change in the SSC revenue for each earner. 
Only employer SSC are involved in this simulation, not the contributions paid by the 
self-employed. The rules governing the social security contributions in Italy are very 
complex with many differentiations depending on the sector of activity, the type of 
occupation and the dimension of the firm. As an illustration, for a manual worker in the 
industrial sector working in a firm with more than 50 employees the contributory rate is 
33% of gross wage for pensions, 1.91% for unemployment insurance, 0.68% for family 
allowances, 3.1% for a wage guarantee fund in case of temporary suspension of the 
activity of the firm, 2.22% for sickness insurance, 0.46% for maternity insurance. The 
total rate reaches 41.57%, of which 9.49 percentage points are formally paid by the 
employee, the rest by the employer.  
 
In the matched data, goods and services corresponding to 18% of total taxable 
expenditure are subject to the 4% VAT rate, 41.5% to the 10% rate and 58.5% to the 
standard rate of 21%. For households of the first equivalent income decile the goods 
and services taxed at 4% represent 26% of total expenditure, a share that gradually falls 
to 13.4% for the richest decile. Goods and services subject to the intermediate 10% rate 
represent 47% of total expenditure for the first decile and 37% for the tenth, and finally 
the standard 21% rate applies to 53% of total expenditure of the first decile and to 63% 
of it for the richest decile. The baseline Gini indexes are 0.29146 for the equivalent 
income distribution, and 0.29504 for the equivalent expenditure one.  
1 Increase only in the standard VAT rate 
In this first case, when the employer SSC rates are reduced on all employees, they fall 
by 8.8% (this is the percentage reduction in the amount of employers SSC that 
corresponds to 1% of GDP from the macro model), while if the reduction is targeted to 
low incomes (defined, from the macro model, as the lowest 45.7% of the distribution of 
gross incomes), then the SSC rates on these workers fall by 26%. Correspondingly, the 
new VAT rate increases from 21% to 26% in the first case, and to 25% in the second. 
The two other rates remain fixed at 4% and 10%.  
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Figure 5.2.1 shows, by deciles of equivalent income computed before the reform, by 
how much disposable income and VAT payments increase after the FD. The change in 
VAT is moderately regressive, while the increase in disposable income is slightly more 
favourable for the richest section of the distribution. As a result, the net effect is very 
mildly regressive. Indeed, the Gini index of the income distribution increases from 
0.29147 to 0.2920, i.e. by only 0.2%. 
Figure 5.2.1: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in Italy – decrease in all SSC rates  
 
On the contrary, if only low incomes benefit from SSC reduction then the net effect is 
clearly progressive (Figure 5.2.2), since the mildly regressive impact of VAT change is 
much more than compensated by the increase in disposable incomes for the first 
deciles. The Gini index falls from 0.29147 to 0.2892, i.e. by -0.77%. Figure 5.2.3 
summarizes these findings showing only the net effects of these two reforms, to see 
more clearly the difference between the two cases.  
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Figure 5.2.2: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in Italy– decrease in SSC rates only for low incomes  
 
Figure 5.2.3: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
If the reform is evaluated on the deciles of equivalent expenditure (Figure 5.2.4), in 
both cases it penalizes more the richest deciles, but only with the targeted change in 
SSC rates it manages to increase the incomes of the poorest deciles. In both cases the 
Gini index of the distribution of equivalent expenditure decreases, by -0.33% in the first 
case and by -0.86% if the FD is targeted to low incomes.  
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Figure 5.2.4: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Italy by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
 
As in the French simulation, but with more evident changes, households of dependent 
manual workers are the biggest gainers from the reform, while the other employees 
benefit only if they participate to the reduction of SSC. Families of pensioners in 
general lose from the reform, since they suffer only from the increase in the standard 
VAT rate. Families with children are better off in any case. The progressive effect of 
targeting the SSC reduction to low-paid workers for the households in which the head is 
unemployed is due to the household composition and therefore to a redistribution 
within households. Indeed, in Italy the low-income workers, as defined in this research, 
are present in 23% of all households. The share of households with an unemployed 
head that have at least one low earner among their members is much higher than the 
average, at 42%, while only 5 households of pensioners out of 100 contain at least one 
low earner. In a shift from SSC to VAT, groups at the margins of the labour market 
(pensioners, unemployed) are normally penalized as they cannot benefit from a cut in 
SSC. For this reason many studies (the Mirrlees Review, for example) suggest to 
increase income support measures (mostly for those not in the labour market) in order 
to compensate for the increase in VAT. In Italy households with an unemployed head 
seem to benefit from a fiscal devaluation concentrated on low earners, but since the 
share of households whose head is unemployed is much lower than that of households 
headed by a retired person (in Italy, 3% against 38%), and since this latter group lose 
from this reform, then the net effect of a FD is still to penalize the families who are not 
in the labour force. The suggestion of the Mirrlees Review is therefore substantiated by 
our analysis. 
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Figure 5.2.5: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by family type  
 
Figure 5.2.6: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by condition of the household 
head  
 
2 Proportional increase in all VAT rates  
If all VAT rates are increased in the same proportion so as to close the public budget, 
they must increase by 15% in the first case of general SSC reduction (the three new 
rates are 4.6%, 11.6% and 24.3%), and by 12.5% in the case of targeted SSC change 
(new rates 4.5%, 11.3%, 23.7%). The distributional effects of this reform are, as in the 
French case, very similar to those shown for the increase in the standard rate only, so it 
would be redundant to illustrate them in detail. As in the previous case, indeed, the Gini 
index for income slightly rises (by 0.28% to 0.2923) if all SSC rates are cut, while it 
decreases (by -0.70% to 0.2894) in the case of a targeted SSC cut. The Gini of 
equivalent expenditure, on the other hand, falls in both cases (by -0.20% to 0.2945 in 
the first case, by -0.75% to 0.2928 in the other one). 
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Figure 5.2.7: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
Figure 5.2.8: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Italy by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
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Figure 5.2.9: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by family type  
 
Figure 5.2.10: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by condition of the household 
head  
 
3 Uniform VAT rate 
The new uniform VAT rate that closes the budget is set at 16.3% with a general 
reduction of SSC, and at 15.9% with a selective reduction. The increase in the two 
reduced rates, together with the reduction of the standard rate, has a strongly regressive 
impact: the VAT burden on disposable income increases by 2.3% for the poorest decile 
and by 1.7% for the second, while this increase is 0.8% for the ninth decile and 0.5% 
for the richest one. On the other hand, the effect of SSC reduction on disposable 
incomes is proportional, about 1% for all deciles. The net effect is a clearly regressive 
impact (Figure 5.2.11). The Gini index of disposable income rises from 0.29147 to 
0.2941, i.e. by 0.90%. On the other hand, with a targeted change in SSC the net impact 
becomes slightly progressive, since the increase in disposable incomes for the lowest 
deciles more than compensates the rise in the VAT burden for them, while the richest 
deciles do not benefit from the reduction of SSC, but pay a slightly increased VAT. 
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Indeed, the Gini index now turns out to be very slightly reduced from the baseline case 
(from 0.29147 to 0.2912, -0.09%). 
Figure 5.2.11: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
Figure 5.2.12: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Italy by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
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When evaluated in terms of equivalent expenditure, this reform is still markedly 
regressive when there is a general cut in SSC (Figure 5.2.12), with a rise in the Gini 
index by 0.73%, but becomes substantially neutral if the reduction in SSC is 
concentrated on low incomes (the Gini actually rises as well, but only by 0.16%). In 
this second case, the VAT increase is still very regressive, but it is compensated by the 
increase in low incomes induced by the SSC change. 
 
The groups particularly hit by this reform are those who cannot benefit from the SSC 
reduction but must pay more VAT, i.e. in particular the pensioners. Households with 
children seem to gain when there is more than one income earner in the family, or in 
any case if the SSC reduction is targeted on low-paid workers (Figure 5.2.13, Figure 
5.2.14). This kind of fiscal devaluation produces therefore a significant redistribution of 
the tax burden across generations.  
Figure 5.2.13: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by family type  
 
Figure 5.2.14: Change in disposable income after FD in Italy by condition of the household 
head  
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Indexation of benefits in Italy 
In Italy the impact of the indexation of benefits (pensions, invalidity and unemployment 
benefits, and cash allowances for families with children rise by around 1.25 percentage 
points; the “proportional tax” needed to balance again the budget is around 0.3% of 
average household disposable income) is lower than that found for France; this measure 
changes only marginally the distributive effect of FD by deciles. The dominant form of 
cash transfer in Italy is represented by pensions, and households of pensioners are 
spread in a fairly uniform way across the income distribution. In particular, when the 
reduction of SSC rates is universal there is, with indexation, an improvement in net 
disposable income for the poorest deciles and a slight fall for the richest 20% of the 
distribution, but the changes are always very small and do not modify the general 
patterns. In the case of targeted reductions of SSC rates only for low incomes, the effect 
of benefit indexation can be observed only from a small reduction of the average 
incomes of the richest deciles.  
Figure 5.2.15: Italy: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without 
indexation of benefits 
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Figure 5.2.16: Italy: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in all 
VAT rates, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of 
benefits 
 
Figure 5.2.17: Italy: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform VAT 
rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of benefits 
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In Italy the indexation of benefits is never enough to change the distributive signs of the 
various cases of FD simulated in this work. This indexation always mitigates the 
regressive impact of FD, when it is already regressive, and produces a more significant 
reduction of the Gini index when the FD is progressive. In all cases, however, the 
changes in the Gini index (from the baseline case, i.e. before the FD) with indexation 
are particularly close to the changes in the Gini without it, so the distributive results of 
FD are always confirmed.  
Table 5.2.1: Italy: Percentage variation in the Gini index for equivalent disposable income 
after the FD, with and without indexation of cash benefits 
 Without benefit 
indexation 
With benefit 
indexation 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate   
1.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.19% +0.03% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low  incomes  -0.77% -0.82% 
   
2 Increase in all VAT rates   
2.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.28% +0.12% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.70% -0.75% 
   
3 Uniform VAT rate   
3.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.90% +0.74% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
-0.09% -0.15% 
Note: percentage changes of the Gini index with respect to the baseline case of the distribution of 
disposable income before the fiscal devaluation. 
 
Benefit indexation seems to favour in particular the households of pensioners and those 
falling in the residual category with head’s condition classified as “other”, i.e. 
housekeepers or disabled persons. This is a consequence of the predominance of 
pensions in the Italian cash benefit system, while monetary transfers to younger 
households are of secondary importance. The households of unemployed persons lose 
from the indexation despite the fact that unemployment benefits are indexed to prices 
because in many households with head unemployed there are other members who are 
working, therefore making this type of household not very different from those with 
employed heads. These distributive patterns are common to all the three hypotheses of 
changes in the VAT rates. 
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Figure 5.2.18: Italy: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
 
 
Figure 5.2.19: Italy: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in all 
VAT rates, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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Figure 5.2.20: Italy: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform VAT 
rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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6 Simulations of unilateral fiscal devaluation in Spain 
6.1 Macro simulations for Spain 
As for the other countries, we simulate a reduction of the SSC financed by an increase 
in VAT, equivalent to 1% of ex ante GDP. The effects in the NiGEM model for Spain 
in Figure 6.1.1 are comparable to the effects for Italy. With an adjustment speed of 
nominal wages comparable to the Italian estimate, employment and unemployment 
already stabilize after 4 years. However, the real labour cost adjusts more smoothly than 
in Italy. Real GDP and consumption respond similarly as in Italy. The larger price 
elasticity of export (1.2) and the slower recovery of production costs lead to a larger 
and longer improvement of the trade balance, but this cannot avoid a deterioration at the 
end.62 
 
The IHS model finds the largest effects (in absolute value) on labour market outcomes 
and GDP for Spain in the long run (Figure 6.1.2). The main reason is that the tax reform 
in Spain enables the largest decrease in the wedge (by 0.9%), which is approximated by 
the sum of the reduction of the SSC rate and the raise in the VAT rate. 63 In addition, the 
SSC system in Spain is flat, as in Italy, while it is very progressive in France. Since the 
SSC reduction is spread more equally over all workers, labour supply in persons 
expands more in Spain. In contrast to Italy, the fraction of high-skilled workers in Spain 
(30%) and France (28%) is comparable, which implies that skill composition effects 
hardly alter the increase in productivity-corrected labour supply. As a result, GDP in 
Spain increases more than in France. 
Sensitivity 
Table 6.1.1 shows that the sensitivity of the results is qualitatively similar as discussed 
for France and Italy. In particular, the indexation option in the IHS model depresses 
employment and GDP slightly relative to the basecase due to the low replacement rates 
of social transfers. GDP is rather sensitive to targeting the SSC reduction to low-skilled 
workers in view of their large population share (48%).  
 
  
                                                     
62 The Spanish reform has a small effect on the euro exchange rate: 0.06% in year 1 and 0.14% in year 9. 
63 The real wedge is defined as  where  denotes the labour tax rate and t the 
consumption tax rate. This wedge is approximated by . Its change is given by the sum of the change 
in the SSC rate and the change in the VAT rate, because the other tax rates are kept constant.  
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Figure 6.1.1: Fiscal devaluation in Spain – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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Figure 6.1.2: Fiscal devaluation in Spain – IHS 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
   
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption (%GDP)    Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline for the first 3 figures, % point difference for 
the last three. 
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Table 6.1.1: Sensitivity analysis for Spain 
  GDP  TB (%GDP) 
NiGEM 1y 9y 1y 9y 
Basecase 0.01% 0.32% -0.01% -0.37% 
Indexation 0.01% 0.30% -0.00% -0.34% 
Wage rigidity 0.00% 0.38% 0.00% -0.36% 
Export elasticity 0.03% 0.30% 0.03% -0.38% 
     
IHS SR LR SR LR  
Basecase 0.02% 0.12% 0.17% -0.06% 
Indexation 0.01% 0.09% 0.16% -0.04% 
Ex ante budget closure 0.00% 0.12% 0.29% -0.06% 
Targeted SSC 0.20% -0.47% 0.37% -0.09% 
Summary 
Table 6.1.2 provides an overview of the macro-results for Spain. The NiGEM results 
show that shifting from wage to consumption taxation is successful in reducing 
temporarily real labour costs, leading to a higher employment and GDP. The fall in the 
relative price of domestic goods leads to an initial increase in net exports. In later years, 
the stimulus to consumption is reflected by the deterioration of the trade balance. 
Among the four countries considered, the IHS model finds the largest long-run effects 
on the real producer wage, (un)employment and GDP in Spain. The expansion of 
consumption is small, mirrored by a small fall in net exports. Two main channels 
explain the long-run results. First, when social transfers are not adjusted for the higher 
VAT rate, workers will moderate their wage claims. Second, the unexpected VAT hike 
imposes an extra tax burden on existing generations who consume out of accumulated 
wealth, whereas future generations benefit from less distortive taxation. Sensitivity 
analysis gives similar results as discussed for the other countries. 
Table 6.1.2: Summary of fiscal devaluation in Spain 
 SR max.** (NiGEM) LR (IHS) 
Real producer wage -0.59% -0.08% 
Real GDP 0.32% 0.12% 
Employment 0.94% 0.15% 
Unemployment rate* -0.65% -0.08% 
Consumption (LR*) 1.27% 0.09% 
Trade balance (%GDP)* -0.37% -0.06% 
* % point difference; ** maximum effect (in absolute value) during first 9 years 
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6.2 Micro simulations for Spain 
The microsimulation model used for the Spanish case has been developed by the 
Spanish Institute of Fiscal Studies (IEF, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales). We count on a 
simulator for indirect taxation which includes VAT and excise tax, and a tax benefit 
simulator (integrated in EUROMOD) which permits to simulate changes in personal 
income tax, social security contributions (SSC) and the whole system of transfers. Our 
first idea was to use EUROMOD, but finally we programmed the changes in SSC to use 
the latest data from the Survey of Living Conditions (not included in EUROMOD at the 
moment). 
 
The VAT simulator uses the Household Budget Survey for 2009, and includes the 
information about households’ consumption. The Survey of Living Conditions refers 
also to 2009 data and includes information about household income. Since there is not a 
common survey including income and consumption, it was necessary to match 
information of the households. We generated different clusters according to 
demographic characteristics of the household. The same groups were generated in the 
Survey of Living Conditions and in the Household Budget Survey. The number of 
clusters to be matched had to be adjusted considering these two conditions: 
 A number of groups sufficiently high to insure variability 
 A number of groups not so big to produce many empty groups in the original 
surveys for income or consumption. 
 
The VAT rates for year 2011 are three: super reduced: 4%; reduced: 8%; ordinary: 
18%. The proportion of revenue obtained from each rate is 4% from the super-reduced, 
22% from the reduced, and 74% from the ordinary rate. The main goods taxed with non 
ordinary or zero rates are: food, household rental, public services, health, public 
transport, culture, education, restaurants and hotels. 
 
Social security contributions for dependent workers are shared between employers and 
employees. They include contributions to health, retirement, and accident insurance 
(common rate) and unemployment (different rate). The rates are common while the 
bases depend on the category and occupation of the employee. There are minimum and 
maximum bases for different occupations and categories of workers. The following 
table summarizes the rates valid in 2012 as applied in the simulations. 
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Table 6.2.1: Overview of SSC rates in Spain. 
 Employer Employee Total 
Health, retirement, and injuries 23,60% 4,70% 28,30% 
Unemployment 5,50% 1,55% 7,05% 
Total 29,10% 6,25% 35,35% 
 
The unemployment rates also depend on the kind of contract (full time or part time). 
Different rates apply for self-employed (distinguishing farmers and others), domestic 
workers and retirees. There are also bonuses (on the bases but not on the rates) for 
workers depending on their age (for workers aged 60 and more). 
 
The rates used for uprating the nominal values of variables expressed in monetary terms 
(incomes and expenditures) have been obtained from the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics. The factor for uprating (between 2009 and 2011) income is 5.3%, and for 
uprating consumption is 6.3%. 
 
The simulations for Spain have been conducted following a route which is partly 
different from that followed in the other cases, but substantially similar and with results 
that are comparable: instead of setting a given % change in SSC rates taken from the 
macro models, the simulations have started considering a VAT increase providing 1% 
of GDP, and then looking for the corresponding reduction of employer SSC that 
guarantees ex post budget balance. The baseline values of the Gini index are 0.2592 for 
the distribution of equivalent disposable income and 0.2075 for equivalent expenditure.  
1 Increase only in the standard VAT rate 
An increase in revenues from the standard VAT equal to 1% of GDP means a total 
amount of 10.700 millions of €. The final standard rate in VAT should be increased to 
the rate of 22.5%. To be neutral in revenue, we should decrease the employer rate of 
SSC. As we do not have information about the rates, but the total contribution of the 
employer, we calculate the percentage reduction allowed by the increase in VAT. This 
means a reduction of 13.2% when we consider the whole population, and a reduction of 
45.5% in SSC when only the low earners rates are reduced. The change in income 
following the reduction in all SSC rates favours the richest deciles, while the increase in 
VAT is more or less proportional, with the exception of the top 10%. As a result, the 
reform is regressive (Figure 6.2.1), producing gains only for the richest 30%. The 
pattern of the changes in disposable income is very similar to that found in the French 
case, even if here the lower deciles lose more. The Gini index of income rises to 
0.2649, i.e. by 2.2%. 
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Figure 6.2.1: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in Spain – decrease in all SSC rates  
 
 
If, however, only SSC rates for low-paid employees are cut, the reform turns out to be 
slightly progressive despite the clear regressivity of the VAT change (Figure 6.2.2). The 
Gini index falls by -0.46% to 0.258. Figure 6.2.3 summarizes these findings and shows 
how variable are the distributional results depending on the different alternatives on the 
reduction of SSC. Figure 6.2.4 describes the distributive effect of FD in terms of 
changes in “net” expenditure by deciles of equivalent household expenditure. It shows 
that the reform would be regressive, with a curve very similar to the French one, if the 
reduction in SSC rates would be universal (Gini up from 0.19677 to 0.1987), while it 
will have a more differentiated effect with a reduction only in SSC rates for low-income 
households: it would be progressive from the fourth decile onwards, regressive for the 
poorest section of the distribution. The net effect on the Gini index signals a regressive 
impact: the Gini rises from 0.19677 to 0.19873. 
-3.0% 
-2.0% 
-1.0% 
0.0% 
1.0% 
2.0% 
3.0% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
change in income 
change in VAT 
net change 
108 
TAXUD/2011/DE/338 
 
Figure 6.2.2: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in Spain – decrease in SSC rates for low-paid workers 
 
 
Figure 6.2.3: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
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Figure 6.2.4: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Spain by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
 
As in other countries, this reform would worsen the conditions of the elderly and their 
households (Figure 6.2.5), while improving those of employees as manual workers and, 
with a general reduction in SSC, also of the other employees (Figure 6.2.6). As in the 
Italian case, households of the unemployed gain with a fiscal devaluation because some 
low earners live in households with heads who are unemployed, particularly in South 
European countries where children typically leave late the parents’ house.  
Figure 6.2.5: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by family type  
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Figure 6.2.6: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by condition of the household 
head  
 
2 Proportional increase in all VAT rates  
An increase in all the rates according to the revenue shares but generating the same 
increase of 10.700 millions of € should raise the rates to the levels: 5%, 9% and 21%. 
The changes in SSC are the same we presented in Reform 1. Figure 6.2.7 is very similar 
to Figure 6.2.3, so there is no need to repeat the analysis and to comment the relative 
graphs. Also the effects on the distribution of equivalent expenditure are very close to 
those already illustrated in Figure 6.2.4. 
Figure 6.2.7: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
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Figure 6.2.8: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Spain by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
 
 
Figure 6.2.9: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by family type  
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Figure 6.2.10: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by condition of the 
household head  
 
3 Uniform VAT rate 
The adoption of a uniform rate worsens the distributive effects of the fiscal devaluation. 
The Gini index, for the case of a universal reduction in SSC rates, increases by 2.76% 
to 0.2664. Now the reform appears to be regressive even in the case of a targeted 
reduction in SSC rates, even if now the Gini index barely moves, to 0.2595 (+0.11%). 
The negative effect for the poor of the income distribution is greater than in the French 
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burden on the first decile. A targeted change of SSC on low earners only is not enough 
to guarantee a significantly progressive impact of the reform, but it still benefits much 
more the households with children and with manual workers than the households of 
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Figure 6.2.11: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
Figure 6.2.12: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Spain by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
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Figure 6.2.13: Change in disposable income after FD by in Spain by family type  
 
 
Figure 6.2.14: Change in disposable income after FD in Spain by condition of the 
household head  
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close after the indexation of cash transfers (which are increased in the various cases by 
percentages around 2%-2.1%) is on average 0.4% of disposable household income. The 
impact of the indexation of benefits is more significant than in Italy: even if the 
distributive effects of the fiscal devaluation are similar to those of the no-indexation 
scenario, the positive impact of the indexation is now clearly apparent for the lowest 
deciles.  
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Figure 6.2.15: Spain: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without 
indexation of benefits 
 
Figure 6.2.16: Spain: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
all VAT rates, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of 
benefits 
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Figure 6.2.17: Spain: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform 
VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of 
benefits 
 
As in the other countries, Spain confirms that the indexation of benefits is never 
sufficient for changing the distributive signs of the various cases of FD simulated in this 
work. This indexation always mitigates the regressive impact of FD, when it is already 
regressive, and produces a more significant reduction of the Gini index from the no-FD 
baseline case when the FD is progressive. In all cases, however, the changes in the Gini 
index with indexation are very close to the change in the Gini without it, so the 
distributive results of FD are confirmed.  
Table 6.2.2: Spain: percentage variation in the Gini index of equivalent disposable income 
after the FD, with and without indexation of cash benefits 
 Without benefit 
indexation 
With benefit 
indexation 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate   
1.1 change in all SSC rates  +2.20% +1.89% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low  incomes  -0.46% -0.76% 
   
2 Increase in all VAT rates   
2.1 change in all SSC rates  +2.26% +1.92% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.39% -0.72% 
   
3 Uniform VAT rate   
3.1 change in all SSC rates  +2.76% +2.04% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  +0.11% -0.60% 
Note: the numbers in the table refer to the percentage change of the Gini index with respect to the baseline 
case of the distribution of disposable income before the Fiscal devaluation. 
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As in Italy and France, in Spain the indexation of benefits reduces the average loss 
particularly for the households of pensioners and, still as Italy, it has not a great effect 
for the unemployed. The pensioners remain, however, among the net losers from the 
FD, as in the other countries considered in this work.  
Figure 6.2.18: Spain: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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Figure 6.2.19: Spain: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
all VAT rates, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
Figure 6.2.20: Spain: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform 
VAT rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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7 Simulations of unilateral fiscal devaluation in Austria 
7.1 Macro simulations for Austria 
We also consider for Austria a budget-neutral tax mix of a SSC reduction and a VAT 
hike (equivalent to 1% of ex ante GDP). The NiGEM model specifies the least rigid 
nominal wages in Austria, with a half-life adjustment of only 1.7 years. As a 
consequence, the real producer wage already returns to its base level in the second year, 
while fluctuations in employment and unemployment get smaller starting in the third 
year (see Figure 7.1.1). The isolated VAT-reform is already expansionary after seven 
years, which contributes to the expansion of GDP under the mixed reform. Following 
the expansion of the economy, consumption in Austria increases the most of the four 
countries. With the smallest price elasticity of export demand and the largest expansion 
of consumption, the trade balance ends in the most unfavourable position relative to the 
other countries. 
 
The IHS model finds adjustment paths and long-run outcomes that are similar as 
discussed for the other countries (Figure 7.1.2). Among the countries considered, fiscal 
devaluation in Austria has the smallest effects on long-run employment and GDP. The 
(small) differences with France can again be attributed to differences in tax and benefit 
systems. The firms’ SSC contribution is regressive in Austria, while it is progressive in 
France. As a consequence, more labour is supplied mainly by low-skilled workers in 
Austria, implying that productivity-corrected aggregate labour supply and hence output 
increases less than in France. These skill composition effects are mitigated by more 
progressive labour taxes in Austria. The tax rate increases stronger in labour income, 
which dampens the incentive effects of higher wages. The smaller increase in GDP 
contributes to the larger increase in consumption, as a fraction of GDP. The expansion 
of consumption is almost identical in Austria and France (0.30% and 0.29%). The 
growth in long-run consumption is reflected by the fall in net exports (both in terms of 
GDP). 
Sensitivity 
The sensitivity analysis is summarized in Table 7.1.1. In view of the very low price 
elasticity of exports in the NiGEM model, even doubling its value has hardly an effect 
on any of the variables. Long-run GDP in the IHS model is less sensitive to price 
indexation of social transfers since social security is less generous in Austria than in 
France. Despite the small population fraction of low-skilled workers (18%), targeting 
the reduction of the SSC rate is still detrimental to steady-state GDP. The trade balance 
ratio in the long run is almost the same in all IHS scenarios. 
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Figure 7.1.1: Fiscal devaluation in Austria – NiGEM  
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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Figure 7.1.2: Fiscal devaluation in Austria – IHS 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption (%GDP)    Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline for the first 3 figures, % point difference for 
the last three. 
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Table 7.1.1: Sensitivity analysis for Austria 
  GDP TB (%GDP) 
NiGEM 1y 9y 1y 9y 
Basecase 0.02% 0.38% -0.05% -0.54% 
Indexation 0.04% 0.45% -0.07% -0.65% 
Wage rigidity 0.00% 0.41% -0.02% -0.84% 
Export elasticity 0.02% 0.38% -0.05% -0.54% 
     
IHS SR LR SR LR  
Basecase 0.00% 0.06% 0.24% -0.12% 
Indexation -0.01% 0.04% 0.26% -0.13% 
Ex ante budget closure -0.03% 0.06% 0.41% -0.12% 
Targeted SSC 0.20% -0.30% 0.42% -0.11% 
Summary 
The short-run and long-run outcomes for the main aggregates are finally presented in 
Table 7.1.2. Compared to the NiGEM outcomes of the other countries, the real labour 
cost returns the fastest to its initial level, leading to only a short increase of 
employment. Following the expansion of GDP, the increase in consumption and the 
decrease in net exports are the largest in Austria. The IHS model finds the smallest 
long-run increases of employment and GDP but the largest increases of consumption 
and the trade balance. The decline of the real transfers and the redistribution in favour 
of future generations again drive these results. The sensitivity analysis yields a similar 
pattern as discussed for the other countries. 
Table 7.1.2: Summary of fiscal devaluation in Austria 
 SR max.** (NiGEM) LR (IHS) 
Real producer wage -0.63% -0.06% 
Real GDP 0.38% 0.06% 
Employment 0.49% 0.07% 
Unemployment rate* -0.40% -0.04% 
Consumption (LR*) 1.43% 0.12% 
Trade balance (%GDP)* -0.54% -0.12% 
* % point difference; ** maximum effect (in absolute value) during first 9 years 
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7.2 Micro simulations for Austria 
For Austria, the distributive impact of FD has been computed using ITABENA, a tax-
benefit-microsimulation model for Austria that has been developed by IHS in 2005. It 
has, since then, been constantly maintained and updated, and served as basis for a wide 
range of policy evaluations. It entails the Austrian tax-benefit system and primarily 
calculates disposable income of Austrian individuals and households. The model is 
based on a representative micro-data set, the Austrian version of the EU-SILC 2004-
2010 (EU-Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). The annual survey 
SILC contains detailed information on individual and household characteristics as well 
as detailed information on gross incomes out of various sources. The wave of 2010 – 
used within this project – contains information on 6,186 households (14,079 
individuals). 
 
The information is used to calculate, step by step, the elements of the Austrian tax-
benefit system, considering income taxes, social security contributions, family 
allowances, parental leave benefits, social assistance and so forth. ITABENA accounts 
for every tax or benefit which is relevant for the composition of the disposable income 
from a household or an individual perspective. When disposable income is calculated, a 
detailed representation of given household’s income components can be delivered. 
Moreover, the model allows for the calculation of counterfactual taxes and benefits, 
thus making it possible to change elements of the system in order to evaluate ex-ante 
the distributional effects of a given reform proposal. These effects can be analysed for 
different groups, e.g. by income deciles, household composition, age, gender or any 
other socio-economic characteristic. 
 
In order to account for indirect taxes a consumption module has been added in the 
current project. The EU-SILC does not contain the consumption data required for this 
module. We therefore link the wave of 2010 to the Austrian Household Budget Survey 
2009/10 (HBS), that contains detailed expenditure data on the household level as well 
as socio-economic information on 6,534 households. The Austrian household budget 
survey is conducted every five years. We have used the last version (2009/10).  
 
We match a similar record from the budget dataset to each record from the SILC using 
grade-correspondence within pre-defined clusters. We cluster according to the criteria 
of the age group of the household head (above or below 65 years of age), whether the 
household is a couple household, whether there are children in the household, and 
according to equivalent-income decile, to make sure that the estimates of the ITABENA 
model mirror the aggregate expenditure behaviour of Austrian households. To further 
improve the quality of the match, we also cluster according to the educational 
attainment of the household head.  
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In the current project the matched dataset of EU-SILC 2010 and HBS 2009/10 was 
updated to 2012 in the following way: 
 Wage incomes were updated by the increase of wage incomes from 200964 to 2012 
(7.3%).  
 Expenditures were updated by the increase in private consumption from 2009 to 
2012 (11.1%). 
 All other monetary variables were increased by the nominal increase of GDP from 
2009 to 2012 (12.7%). 
All uprating values are according to the IHS Economic Forecast 2012 to 2013.65 
 
The tax-benefit rules applied are the ones valid in 2012. Private expenditure in our 
dataset reaches € 126,336m in 2009 values66, in the system of national accounts it is € 
145,678m67. Our model results in revenues out of VAT of € 14,047m in 2009 values; 
according to the system of national accounts revenues out of VAT equalled € 
22,158m68.  
 
In Austria there are three different rates of VAT plus the 0% rate: 
 20% (standard rate) 
 12% (special rate) 
 10% (reduced rate) 
The special rate of 12% is applicable for farm gate sale of wine, what could not be 
distinguished in our data. The reduced rate of 10% applies (coarsely) on food, rent, 
pharmaceuticals, transport and books. The only real 0% VAT rate that could be 
distinguished in our data (and in reform type 3 be abolished) is on travelling abroad. 
VAT exemptions where the seller cannot subtract the VAT paid on inputs are for 
example bank and insurance services, medical and social services, education, postal 
services. One big share of the 0%-VAT-net-expenditures shown below is due to 
imputed rents (€ 11,162m). 
 
According to our model the net expenditures and equivalent revenues out of VAT for 
every rate are the following in 2009 values:  
 20%: € 53,413m  VAT of € 10,683m 
 12%: could not be distinguished 
 10%: € 33,642m  VAT of € 3,364m 
 0%: € 25,234m 
 
                                                     
64 The income data in EU-SILC 2010 is from the year 2009. 
65 http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/prognose290312.pdf [12-05-25] 
66 no uprate here 
67 http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/volkswirtschaftliche_gesamtrechnungen/index.html [12-05-25] 
68http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/oeffentliche_finanzen_und_steuern/oeffentliche_finanzen/steue
reinnahmen/index.html [12-05-25] 
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Social security contributions for dependent workers are shared between employers and 
employees. They include contributions to health, retirement, unemployment and 
accident insurance as well as contributions to housing, family and insolvency funds. 
The rates depend on the status of the employee (blue- or white-collar worker, civil 
servants). The following table summarizes the rates valid in 2012 as applied in the 
simulations. 
Table 7.2.1: SSC rates in Austria in 2012 
  employer employee 
  blue collar white collar civil servants blue collar white collar civil servants 
health  3.70% 3.83% 3.55% 3.95% 3.82% 4.10% 
retirement 12.55% 12.55% 0.00% 10.25% 10.25% 12.55% 
unemployment 3.00% 3.00% - 3.00% 3.00% - 
accident 1.40% 1.40% 0.47% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
housing fund 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 
family fund 4.50% 4.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
insolvency fund 0.55% 0.55% - 0.00% 0.00% - 
total 26.20% 26.33% 4.52% 17.70% 17.57% 17.15% 
 
Contributions are paid on an income higher than € 5.23669 and lower than € 58.80070. 
The employees’ contribution rate to retirement insurance for civil servants is 
continuously adjusted to the rates of private sector employees (transition rules for 
different cohorts). Unemployment contribution rates paid by employees depend on the 
income: Below monthly €°1.186 the rate is 0°% (with full insurance), up to €°1.294 
1°%, up to €°1.456 2°% and above this threshold 3°%.  
 
Different rates apply for self-employed (distinguishing farmers and others) and retirees. 
As there are no employers’ contributions for these groups their rates have not been 
touched in the conducted simulations.  
 
In the simulations with the SSC change for all wages all rates paid by employers were 
cut by 8.77°%. In the simulations for low incomes only the rates for the 18.12°% of 
employees with the lowest income (above the threshold relevant for social insurance – 
see above) were cut by 83.65°%. The Gini indexes for the baseline distribution, i.e. 
before the fiscal devaluation, are 0.2456 for the distribution of disposable equivalent 
income and 0.3011 for equivalent expenditure.  
                                                     
69Under this threshold only accident insurance (paid by the employer) applies. The employee has the option 
to voluntarily pay for health and retirement insurance. 
70There is no upper limit in the retirement insurance for civil servants and no upper limit in the 
contributions to the family fund. 
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1 Increase only in the standard VAT rate 
The decrease in SSC on all employees by 8.77% is followed by the increase in the 
standard rate of VAT by 9.09% (from 20% to 21.8%) so as to keep budget balance after 
FD. In the other case, the revenues from SSC are reduced on low earners by 83.65%, 
and the standard rate of VAT is raised by 7.30%, to reach 21.5% from 20%. Figure 
7.2.1 shows, for the case of a uniform change in SSC, the separate modifications in 
disposable income and in VAT burden, as well as the difference between these two 
curves, i.e. the net effect on income. The increase in disposable income is greater for 
the higher deciles, while the change in VAT is regressive. As a result, this reform is 
regressive, with a worsening income position in particular for the poorest decile. The 
Gini index increases slightly, by 0.37%, from 0.2456 to 0.2465. 
Figure 7.2.1: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in Austria – decrease in all SSC rates  
 
The opposite conclusion can be reached if we restrict the change in SSC only on low 
incomes (Figure 7.2.2): the regressivity of the change in VAT is more than 
compensated by the increased incomes of the low deciles, for a progressive net impact. 
Indeed, the Gini index falls from 0.2456 to 0.2441, a reduction by -0.61%. Figure 7.2.3 
contains only the net changes for these two cases, in order to allow a better comparison 
between them. 
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Figure 7.2.2: Change in disposable income and VAT (as a percent of disposable income) 
after the FD in Austria – decrease in SSC rates for low incomes 
 
Figure 7.2.3: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
 
Turning to the incidence by deciles of equivalent expenditure (Figure 7.2.4), with 
universal reduction in SSC the effect is nearly proportional or slightly progressive: both 
expenditure and VAT increase regularly from low to high deciles, and only in the top 
decile the increase in the VAT burden is significantly greater than the increase in 
expenditure. On the other hand, with targeted SSC reduction the bottom deciles obtain a 
gain in expenditure level much higher than the rest of the population, so the effect is 
progressive.  
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Figure 7.2.4: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Austria by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
 
The distributive effects by family type and condition of the head confirm what has been 
already found for other countries: the most significant losers are the households of 
pensioners, while families with children obtain a gain which is more relevant with a 
targeted reduction in SSC. 
Figure 7.2.5: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by family type  
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Figure 7.2.6: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by condition of the 
household head  
 
2 Proportional increase in all VAT rates  
When SSC rates are decreased for all workers, they fall by 8.77%; the corresponding 
percentage increase in VAT rates is 6.91%, so the new VAT rates are 10.7% and 24%. 
With targeted reduction of SSC, they fall by 83.65% on low earners, and all VAT rates 
must rise by 5.56% so as to keep a balanced budget. This case, as in other countries, 
strongly resembles the previous one in terms of its distributive impact. The Gini index 
for the universal change in SSC rates rises by 0.43% (previously by 0.37%), while it 
falls by 0.56% (previously by 0.61%) if only SSC rates on low income workers are 
reduced.  
Figure 7.2.7: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
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Figure 7.2.8: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Austria by deciles of equivalent 
disposable expenditure 
 
Figure 7.2.9: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by family type  
 
Figure 7.2.10: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by condition of the 
household head  
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3 Uniform VAT rate 
The uniform VAT rate that allows balancing the budget after a uniform reduction of 
SSC rates equivalent to 1% of GDP turns out to be 16.72%. With a decrease of SSC for 
low earners by 83.65%, the new uniform VAT rate is 16.51%. The distributional effect 
of the first reform is strongly regressive, while that of the second is substantially 
proportional. In the first case, both the income change and in particular the VAT 
increase are in favour of the richest deciles: the VAT burden on income before the 
reform rises by 2.2% for the poorest decile and by 1.4% in the second decile, while the 
increase is only 0.5% for the top one. Consequently, the Gini index rises from 0.2456 to 
0.2475, i.e. by 0.79%. With targeted reduction in SSC, the result is very different 
because of the much more relevant increase in disposable income for the bottom part of 
the distribution, while the distributive effect of the VAT increase is similar in the two 
cases, and the Gini index, particularly sensible to what happens in the central part of the 
distribution, falls by 0.20% to 0.2451.  
Figure 7.2.11: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by deciles of equivalent 
disposable income  
 
 
Across the deciles of equivalent expenditure, however, this reform is always regressive, 
with the incidence graph that closely resembles the Figure 7.2.12 of the Italian case.  
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Figure 7.2.12: Change in disposable expenditure after FD in Austria by deciles of 
equivalent disposable expenditure 
 
Figure 7.2.13: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by family type  
 
 
Figure 7.2.14: Change in disposable income after FD in Austria by condition of the 
household head  
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Indexation of benefits in Austria  
In Austria the “proportional tax” that must be imposed so as to keep public budget 
neutrality after the indexation of cash transfers (which are increased in the various cases 
by percentages varying from 0.71% to 1.23%) is on average around 0.15% of average 
disposable household income. The impact of the indexation of benefits is close to the 
French and Italian cases: the distributive effects of the fiscal devaluation are very 
similar to those of the no-indexation scenario. Only for the left section of the income 
distribution there is a significantly positive impact, but in no case this effect is sufficient 
to change the overall distributive sign of the reform. When the reduction in SSC rates is 
extended to all earnings, the reduction of the regressive impact seems a bit stronger than 
in Italy.  
Figure 7.2.15: Austria: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without 
indexation of benefits 
 
Austria confirms that the indexation of benefits is never sufficient for changing the 
distributive signs of the various cases of FD simulated in this work. This indexation 
always mitigates the regressive impact of FD, when it is already regressive, and 
produces a more significant reduction of the Gini index from the no-FD baseline case 
when the FD is progressive. In all cases, however, the changes in the Gini index with 
indexation are very close to the change in the Gini without it, so the distributive results 
of FD are confirmed. 
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Figure 7.2.16: Austria: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
all VAT rates, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of 
benefits 
 
 
Figure 7.2.17: Austria: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform 
VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income, with and without indexation of 
benefits 
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Table 7.2.2: Austria: percentage variation in the Gini index of equivalent disposable 
income after the FD, with and without indexation of cash benefits 
 Without benefit 
indexation 
With benefit 
indexation 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate   
1.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.37% +0.30% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low  incomes  -0.61% -0.67% 
   
2 Increase in all VAT rates   
2.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.43% +0.35% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.56% -0.62% 
   
3 Uniform VAT rate   
3.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.79% +0.71% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.20% -0.26% 
Note: the numbers in the table refer to the percentage change of the Gini index with respect to the baseline 
case of the distribution of disposable income before the Fiscal devaluation. 
 
As in Italy and unlike France, in Austria the indexation of benefits reduces the average 
loss particularly for the households of pensioners and, unlike Italy, also for the 
unemployed. The pensioners remain, however, among the net losers from the FD, as in 
the other countries considered in this work.  
Figure 7.2.18: Austria: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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Figure 7.2.19: Austria: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and increase in 
all VAT rates, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
 
Figure 7.2.20: Austria: change in disposable income with reduction in SSC and uniform 
VAT rate, by condition of the head, with and without indexation of benefits 
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8 Comparisons of unilateral fiscal devaluation 
8.1 Macro simulations 
Fiscal devaluation is found to have a small, expansionary effect on employment and 
GDP in the short run, according to the NiGEM outcomes (see Table 8.1.1 and Figure 
8.1.1). The positive impact on labour market outcomes is short-lived when the nominal 
wage adjusts more rapidly to the tax reform. According to the NiGEM estimates, the 
reduction in the relative price has a small positive effect on net exports, whereas the 
expansion of domestic demand has a large negative effect. As a consequence, fiscal 
devaluation does not contribute to an improvement of the trade balance in the short 
run.71 The tax reform is ultimately most expansionary in Austria and Italy and least 
expansionary in France. A reversed pattern holds for the trade balance effects: net 
exports fall the most in the former countries and the least in France. 
 
Shifting to the long-run outcomes of IHS in Table 8.1.2 and Figure 8.1.2, we observe 
permanent, though small effects on (un)employment and GDP for all countries. An 
improvement of the trade balance during the first years turns into a deterioration in the 
long run.72 The interpretation of different outcomes across countries points at the 
relevance of specific features of the economies and its institutions. The effectiveness of 
the reform depends on the extent to which it achieves a reduction of the tax wedge and 
the resulting distortions. This interacts with the degree of progressivity of the tax and 
benefit system, in particular of the SSC system. The latter system is characterized as 
very progressive in France; as proportional in Italy and Spain and as regressive in 
Austria. Results are sensitive to the degree of price indexation of social transfers, in 
particular in the case of generous social security systems. By incorporating skill 
composition effects, this model finally demonstrates the relevance of considering that 
different groups of workers might respond differently to a reform and that a reform 
might treat groups differently.  
 
The results of the different models are compared by checking the ranking over the 
countries. Both short-run and long-run effects on (un)employment are found to be the 
largest for Spain. The GDP expansion in the short run is small in France compared to 
the other countries, whereas the differences in the long run are small. Long-run effects 
are most favourable for Spain. Fiscal devaluation has the largest short-run as well as 
long-run effects on consumption and net exports in Austria. 
  
                                                     
71This is in line with QUEST results in EC (2008) but contrary to other studies. 
72While supporting the small, positive effects on labour market variables, the CEPII model for France finds 
a small improvement of the trade balance in the long run. 
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Table 8.1.1: Summary of largest short-run outcomes of NiGEM model 
 France Italy Spain Austria 
Real producer wage -0.70% -1.00% -0.59% -0.63% 
Real GDP 0.17% 0.36% 0.32% 0.38% 
Employment 0.70% 0.74% 0.94% 0.49% 
Unemployment rate* -0.60% -0.56% -0.65% -0.40% 
Consumption 0.63% 1.27% 1.27% 1.43% 
Trade balance (%GDP)* -0.09% -0.39% -0.37% -0.54% 
* % point difference  
Table 8.1.2: Summary of long-run outcomes of IHS model 
 France Italy Spain Austria 
Real producer wage -0.07% -0.04% -0.08% -0.06% 
Real GDP 0.09% 0.10% 0.12% 0.06% 
Employment 0.08% 0.11% 0.15% 0.07% 
Unemployment rate* -0.04% -0.03% -0.08% -0.04% 
Consumption (%GDP)* 0.09% 0.07% 0.09% 0.12% 
Trade balance (%GDP)* -0.09% -0.05% -0.06% -0.12% 
* % point difference 
Figure 8.1.1: Fiscal devaluation – NiGEM 
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Figure 8.1.2: Fiscal devaluation – IHS 
Real GDP     Trade balance (%GDP) 
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8.2 Micro simulations  
This section provides a summary of the distributional effects of FD obtained with the 
tax-benefit microsimulation models employed. Table 8.2.1 sums up for the four 
countries the overall distributive impact of the various cases of FD on the deciles of 
equivalent disposable income, adopting the following symbols to denote the general 
impact of each case:  
 
- -  strongly regressive 
-    regressive 
0   neither regressive nor progressive 
 +    progressive 
 + +  strongly progressive. 
Table 8.2.1: Distributional effects of FD on equivalent disposable income 
 France Italy Austria Spain 
Change in income by deciles  
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate 
    
1.1 change in all SSC rates  - - - - - - - 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  + + + + + +  
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  - - - - - - - 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  + + + + + 
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  - - - - - - - - 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  - - + + - 
% Change in the Gini index 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate 
    
1.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.67% +0.19% +0.37% +2.2% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.31% -0.77% -0.61% -0.46% 
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.73% +0.28% +0.43% +2.26% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.30% -0.70% -0.56% -0.39% 
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  +2.03% +0.90% +0.79% +2.76% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  +0.99% -0.09% -0.20% +0.11% 
 
The first section of the table tries to summarize the visual impression that emerges from 
the observation of the variations in net disposable income (change in disposable income 
minus the change in VAT) across deciles. The bottom section provides the percentage 
changes in the Gini indexes after each reform, always starting from the status quo 
distribution before the reform. There are many points in common among the results for 
the different countries. First, if the SSC reduction is extended to all employees, the 
effect of FD is always regressive, whatever the type of change in VAT rates. Second, 
the regressive impact is particularly clear if the public budget is balanced with the 
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adoption of a uniform VAT rate, therefore implying that the current structure of VAT 
rates actually benefits low-income households. Third, if the SSC reduction is targeted to 
low incomes, then the impact of FD becomes progressive and in many cases it is 
significantly progressive. Fourth, with a uniform VAT rate, only in two cases (Italy and 
Austria) the concentration of SSC reduction on low incomes is sufficient to make the 
reform beneficial for the worse off. In the other two countries (France and Spain) the 
reform is still regressive, even if much less than in the case of a general cut in SSC.  
 
Across countries, Italy and Austria provide very similar results. In France and Spain, on 
the other hand, it is very difficult to produce a progressive impact for FD, and if the 
structure of VAT rates is changed towards uniformity then the effect is regressive in 
any case, particularly in France. Earlier we showed that in France the incidence of SSC 
on the poorer deciles is very low, so a cut in them is not particularly beneficial to the 
first deciles of the distribution, while on the other hand the current design of VAT rates 
seems able to help poorer households.   
 
That a move towards a uniform VAT rate may hurt poorer households is not a new 
result. The recent study by IFS et al. (2011), for example, maintains that (p. 391) “If 
zero and reduced rates were abolished… The progressive pattern of existing zero and 
reduced rates mean that such a reform would be regressive: poorer households (both 
measured in terms of their income or spending) would end up paying more VAT, whilst 
richer households would end up paying less VAT.” (see also Copenhagen Economics, 
2007, p. 32). Our results show, however, that even in this case the concentration of SSC 
reductions on low earners could make the FD progressive in two out of the four 
examined countries. About the other two cases, as we have already observed in the 
description of the French results, the finding of a regressive impact from FD is not a 
sufficient reason to reject this policy option. A government could indeed raise, through 
the change in VAT rates or with other instruments, more revenue in addition to what is 
needed to guarantee budget neutrality, and use the surplus to compensate the losers. Our 
results just emphasize that such a distributional correction is likely to be necessary so as 
to avoid a worsening in the income or expenditure distribution, if the reduction in 
labour costs is universal or if it does not translate fully into higher earnings. 
 
The observation of the changes in the Gini indexes suggests that if the reduction of SSC 
rates is universal, then the country with the strongest regressive impact is indeed always 
Spain, irrespective of the type of change in VAT rates, followed by France, while Italy 
and Austria show very similar and more moderate impacts. If the reduction in SSC is 
targeted to low earners, then in many cases inequality falls, but there is not a consistent 
ordering among the countries: Italy shows the larger fall in the Gini index with an 
increase in the ordinary VAT rate or in all rates, while if all VAT rates are equalized the 
highest reduction of inequality takes place in the Austrian case.  
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If the distributive results are evaluated on the deciles of equivalent expenditure (Table 
8.2.2), the results do not change very much. Now, however, and unlike the 
classification by income deciles, even a general reduction of SSC rates, if financed with 
an increase only in the ordinary VAT rate, has slightly progressive effects in at least 
two countries, Austria and Italy. Italy is the only country where the adoption of a 
uniform VAT rate does not produce a significant regressive effect.  
Table 8.2.2: Distributional effects of FD on equivalent expenditure 
 France Italy Austria Spain 
Change in income by deciles 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate 
    
1.1 change in all SSC rates  -   + + - - 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  + + + + + 
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  -   + 0 - - 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  + + + + + + 
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  - - - - - - - -  
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  - - - - - - 
% Change in the Gini index 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate 
    
1.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.22% -0.33% -0.11% +0.99% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.23% -0.90% -0.38% . 
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.28% -0.20% -0.01% +1.05% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  -0.17% -0.75% -0.30% . 
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  +1.38% +0.73% +0.92% +1.031% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  +0.86% +0.16% +0.62% . 
 
Tables 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 show which groups (defined by condition of the head) benefit 
more and less from the FD, respectively. In general, the biggest beneficiaries are 
households of employees in Italy and Spain, non manual workers in France and Austria. 
With uniform VAT rate, households of manual workers are in general the greatest 
beneficiaries only if SSC are reduced only for low-paid workers. Conversely, the FD 
reform has negative impacts in particular for households of pensioners and self-
employed workers, who do not directly benefit from the SSC reduction (unless there are 
employees in their households) but are subject to higher VAT rates. Households of 
pensioners never appear in the table of “winners” from the FD, while the unemployed 
sometimes benefit if the SSC cut is reserved to low earners (cohabiting sons or partners 
of the unemployed head). 
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Table 8.2.3: Who benefits more from the FD, by condition of the head of household 
 France Italy Austria Spain 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate     
1.1 change in all SSC rates  Manager Employee manual Employee not 
manual 
Employee manual 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
Employee manual Employee manual Unemployed Unemployed 
     
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  Manager Employee manual Employee not 
manual 
Employee manual 
and not manual 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
Employee manual Employee manual Unemployed Unemployed 
     
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  Employee not 
manual 
Manager Employee not 
manual 
Employee manual 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
Employee not 
manual 
Employee manual Employee manual Employee manual 
and Unemployed 
 
Table 8.2.4: Who loses more from the FD, by condition of the head of the household 
 France Italy Austria Spain 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate     
1.1 change in all SSC rates  Pensioner Self-employed, 
entrepreneur 
Unemployed Self-employed, 
Pensioner 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
Manager Manager Pensioner Manager 
     
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  Pensioner Self employed, 
entrepreneur, 
pensioner 
Unemployed Pensioner 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
Manager, self-
employed, 
entrepreneur 
Manager Pensioner Manager 
     
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  Pensioner Other Unemployed Pensioner 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
Pensioner Other Pensioner Pensioner 
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The comparison of winners and losers by household type (Tables 8.2.5 and 8.2.6) 
confirms that almost everywhere households of adults with or without children are the 
biggest beneficiaries, while the elderly are always among the biggest losers.  
Table 8.2.5: Who benefits more from the FD, by type of household 
 France Italy Austria Spain 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate     
1.1 change in all SSC rates  >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
>1A, 0C, 0O 1A, >0C, 0O >1A, >0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O 
     
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
>1A, 0C, 0O 1A, >0C, 0O >1A, >0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O 
     
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low 
 incomes  
1A, >0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O >1A, >0C, 0O >1A, 0C, 0O 
* Number of Adults, Children and Older persons 
Table 8.2.6: Who loses more from the FD, by type of household 
 France Italy Austria Spain 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate     
1.1 change in all SSC rates  0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, 1O 0A, 0C, 1O 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low 
incomes  
1A, 0C, 0O 0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, 1O 0A, 0C, 1O 
     
2 Increase in all VAT rates     
2.1 change in all SSC rates  0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, 1O 0A, 0C, 1O 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low 
incomes 
  
0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, 1O 0A, 0C, 1O 
3 Uniform VAT rate     
3.1 change in all SSC rates  0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, 1O 0A, 0C, 1O 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low 
incomes  
0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, >1O 0A, 0C, 1O 0A, 0C, 1O 
* Number of Adults, Children and Older persons 
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Another useful way to compare the results obtained for different countries is to put in a 
single graph the percentage changes in (net) disposable income for a given reform for 
the four countries. Figure 8.2.1 for example shows the % change of disposable income 
in the case of a general reduction in SSC financed with an increase only in the standard 
VAT rate. It is clear that the effect is always regressive, particularly in Spain and then 
in France, while in Italy and Austria it is not far from proportional. 
Figure 8.2.1: Change in disposable income with reduction in all SSC and increase in 
standard VAT rate, by deciles of equivalent disposable income 
 
If, on the other hand, the increase in only the standard VAT rate is used to finance a 
targeted reduction in SSC for low earners (Figure 8.2.2), then the impact is progressive, 
with the partial exception of Spain. 
 
Turning to the case of the introduction of a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services, 
the impact is very similar and regressive across the four countries if the reduction in 
SSC is general (Figure 8.2.3). It varies more across countries with a targeted change in 
SSC rates (Figure 8.2.4): still regressive in France, uncertain in Spain with a marked 
regressivity in the first deciles, neutral in Austria and very lightly progressive in Italy. 
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Figure 8.2.2: Change in disposable income with reduction in SSC on low-paid workers and 
increase in standard VAT rate 
 
Figure 8.2.3: Change in disposable income with reduction in all SSC and uniform VAT 
rate 
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Figure 8.2.4 Change in disposable income with reduction in SSC on low-paid workers and 
uniform VAT rate 
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9 Simulations of multilateral fiscal devaluation 
As discussed in the literature survey (Section 2.8), fiscal devaluation can have negative 
and positive spillovers on other economies. On the one hand, improving 
competitiveness of one country harms the external position of other countries. On the 
other hand, exports of other countries benefit from the expansionary effects on GDP of 
fiscal devaluation (EC, 2008, p. 198). In this section we examine whether a country 
benefits more from a unilateral than from a simultaneous implementation of the tax 
shift. For this purpose we use the NiGEM model as it allows for spillover effects 
between countries.73 The tax reform is modelled in exactly the same way as in the 
unilateral scenario: the SSC is reduced by 1% of GDP and the VAT is increased by 1% 
of GDP. The labour tax rate is changed, starting in year 5, to ensure that the debt ratio 
ultimately returns to its starting level. We consider two multilateral scenarios: 
 In the first scenario fiscal devaluation is undertaken jointly by France, Italy and 
Spain (labelled FRITSP). 
 The second scenario extends the set of devaluing countries to Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Incorporating the remaining euro-countries makes little 
difference for the main findings, as can be seen from the GDP shares in the Euro 
Area in Table 9.1 (labelled FRITSPGENLBE). 
 
We again assume that the ECB does not adjust the nominal interest until 2015. After 
2015 the interest rate is increased in response to higher inflation and higher nominal 
GDP. Forward-looking currency markets anticipate the tightening of monetary policy, 
causing an immediate depreciation of the euro. The maximum impact on the exchange 
rate of the euro against the dollar is 0.84% in year 9 in the 3-country scenario and 
1.58% in the 6-country scenario. 
  
                                                     
73 Barrell et al. (2007 and 2012) have used the NiGEM model to compare fiscal multipliers in unilateral and 
multilateral scenarios. Barrell et al. (2012) discuss simulations of the fiscal consolidation programmes 
planned in 2012. On the one hand, output contracts more in a joint policy scenario compared to a 
unilateral scenario due to negative spillovers. On the other hand, this effect might be offset by a lower 
interest rate set by the ECB and a large depreciation of the exchange rate in a multilateral setting. GDP in 
France is negatively affected by a joint policy action while the opposite holds for the 3 other countries 
considered in our study (Figure 16). 
150 
TAXUD/2011/DE/338 
 
Table 9.1: GDP shares (%) in 2011 
Country GDP share 
Germany 27.8 
France 21.6 
Italy 17.1 
Spain 11.6 
Netherlands 6.5 
Belgium 4.0 
Austria 3.3 
Greece 2.4 
Finland 2.1 
Portugal 1.9 
Ireland 1.7 
 
Simulation outcomes for individual countries and the Euro Area are presented in 
Figures 9.1 to 9.6. Results for the main variables are given for all countries in Table 9.2. 
Effects on the Euro Area are weighted averages over 11 countries, using the GDP 
shares in Table 9.1 as weights. 
9.1 Effects on France 
In order to explain the full effects of fiscal devaluation, we first consider the 
components of the tax reform in isolation. Figure 9.1 compares the effects for France on 
GDP (left) and the trade balance (right) between the unilateral scenario and the second 
multilateral scenario (Remember that the 6 largest countries join the reform in the latter 
scenario). Red lines correspond to the unilateral case and purple lines to the multilateral 
case. 
Figure 9.1: Multilateral reduction of the SSC rate and increase in the VAT rate: effects on 
France – NiGEM 
Real GDP (% difference)    Trade balance (change in % point GDP) 
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The full lines refer to an increase in the VAT rate. GDP in the multilateral scenario 
contracts more than in the unilateral scenario. This finding can be explained by a worse 
export performance. Export demand mainly suffers from the contractive effects of 
foreign VAT hikes. Exports fall the more the larger the number of VAT raising 
countries. Exports are also affected by changes in relative export prices. The higher 
nominal wage claims increase prices in all VAT raising countries. French export prices 
increase the more the higher the number of joining countries. When labour costs 
increase in more countries, French firms can apply a higher pass-through to export 
prices. French prices strongly depend on the German participation: if Germany does not 
increase VAT, increases of French export prices are much smaller. As a consequence, 
the trade balance improves less in the multilateral scenario during the first years. 
 
Opposite effects are found for the reduction of the SSC rate (given by the dotted lines). 
As this reform is expansive, GDP in the Euro Area increases more when more countries 
implement it. For the devaluing country itself, GDP expands less in the multilateral 
scenario. The value of French exports does increase more when more countries reduce 
SSC, because of favourable quantity effects and a smaller fall of prices. This 
contributes to a smaller deterioration of the trade balance in the multilateral scenario. 
 
Finally, we discuss the full effects of fiscal devaluation as presented in Figure 9.2. The 
real producer wage is hardly differently affected in the unilateral and multilateral 
scenarios because the positive effect of the VAT increase is offset by the negative effect 
of the SSC reduction. For instance, in the second multilateral scenario real labour costs 
increase the most after the VAT increase and fall the most after the SSC reduction, such 
that the combined effect is similar across the scenarios. As indicated by the results for 
the isolated reforms, the expansion of French GDP is smaller the more countries 
devalue. GDP is hardly affected in the scenario with 6 participating countries. 
Differences in employment effects are in line with GDP effects but remain small. This 
implies that the growth of GDP is mainly driven by increases in total demand. With 
fixed labour supply, effects on the unemployment rate are mirrored by the employment 
effects. The ranking of the consumption effects is in line with the GDP effects: 
consumption is stimulated the most in the unilateral scenario. Concerning the trade 
balance effects, we have seen that both the positive effects of the VAT increase and the 
negative effects of the SSC reduction are smaller in the multilateral scenarios. The 
overall fiscal devaluation effect is a sum of these positive and negative outcomes, and 
therefore it is small (maximal 0.1% of GDP) and its sign varies in time.  
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Figures 9.3 and 9.4 confirm that the patterns discussed for France also hold for Italy and 
Spain: 
 The effects on the real producer wage and (un)employment are similar across the 
unilateral and multilateral scenarios. 
 GDP expands the most in the unilateral scenario and the gains are lower when more 
countries coordinate the tax reform. 
 The consumption effects are in line with the GDP effects: consumption benefits the 
most from a unilateral devaluation. 
 Net exports (as %GDP) fall the least when GDP increases are the smallest, meaning 
that the trade balance weakens less when more countries join the reform. 
9.2 Effects on Germany 
Before discussing the effects on the Euro Area, it is informative to examine the effects 
on Germany. Notice that we include in Figure 9.5 also the scenario in which Germany 
unilaterally implements fiscal devaluation.74 We find similar results for Germany. First, 
as expected, Germany is the least affected in the multilateral scenario in which it does 
not participate (blue line). Second, the developments of the real producer wage and 
(un)employment hardly differ between the unilateral and the second multilateral 
scenario, indicating the importance of the German participation in the joint reform. As 
found for the other countries, GDP and consumption effects are larger in the unilateral 
scenario than in the multilateral scenarios.  
9.3 Effects on Euro zone 
Effects on the Euro Area are given by weighted averages over 11 countries in Figure 
9.6. As expected, real producer wages in the Euro Area fall the most on impact in the 
broad second scenario but at the same time recover the fastest in this case (see red line). 
The ranking of the GDP effects is opposite to the one found for the French, Italian and 
Spanish economies, at least after year 5. In case fiscal devaluation is implemented by 
all the large countries, a contraction of GDP during the first years is followed by the 
strongest expansion during the last years. The effect on the EA aggregate is dominated 
by the relatively strong effect in Germany. The initial fluctuations in employment and 
unemployment are the largest in the extensive second scenario but both variables return 
quickly to the starting level in all scenarios. The consumption effects are again in line 
with the GDP effects. Consumption is first most depressed and later most expanded in 
the second scenario. The ranking of the ultimate effects on the trade balance (as %GDP) 
is opposite to the one of the GDP effects. The trade balance deteriorates the strongest in 
the expansionary, second scenario. 
                                                     
74 The euro depreciates by 0.19% in the first year and 0.30% in the ninth year following the unilateral fiscal 
devaluation in Germany. 
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9.4 Summary 
The evaluation of the different scenarios shows that the unilateral implementation of 
fiscal devaluation is the best option for a country that wants to expand its GDP. The 
GDP effects are less favourable when the three countries France, Italy and Spain 
coordinate the tax swap. A Euro Area-wide implementation is the least attractive option 
for these individual countries. In contrast, when the aim of the reform is to stimulate the 
economy of the EU as a whole, a broad implementation is considered the best 
alternative. This finding again reflects that the positive spillovers dominate the negative 
spillovers according to the NiGEM estimates. Others, arguing that the trade channel is 
the main driver of the GDP expansion, claim that an EA-wide fiscal devaluation is not 
effective, because it fails to improve the competitive position of an individual country 
vis-à-vis its EA trading partners. Anyway, one should realize that output gains remain 
small and temporary in every scenario. 
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Figure 9.2: Multilateral fiscal devaluation: effects on France – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
 
Employment     Unemployment rate 
 
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
 
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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Figure 9.3: Multilateral fiscal devaluation: effects on Italy – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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Figure 9.4: Multilateral fiscal devaluation: effects on Spain – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
 
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
 
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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Figure 9.5: Multilateral fiscal devaluation: effects on Germany – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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Figure 9.6: Multilateral fiscal devaluation: effects on Euro 11 – NiGEM 
Real producer wage    Real GDP 
  
Employment     Unemployment rate 
  
Consumption     Trade balance (%GDP) 
  
Note: horizontal axis: years; vertical axis: % difference from the baseline, % point difference for the unemployment 
rate and trade balance. 
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Table 9.2a: Effects in first year of fiscal devaluation in unilateral and multilateral 
scenarios (%-deviations from basecase) 
 FR IT SP OE GE NL BG GR FN PT IR EA 
Real producer wage           
1 country -0.70 -1.00 -0.59 -0.63 -0.44        
FRITSP -0.71 -1.00 -0.24  0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.38 
GEFRITSPNLBG -0.75 -0.99 -0.59  0.02 -0.54 0.13 -0.79 -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.08 -0.51 
             
GDP             
1 country  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.10        
FRITSP -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
GEFRITSPNLBG -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.28 -0.17 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 -0.13 -0.12 
             
Employment             
1 country  0.63  0.74  0.94  0.49  0.50        
FRITSP  0.62  0.73  0.29 -0.04  0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.28 
GEFRITSPNLBG  0.63  0.69  0.87 -0.09  0.57 -0.32  0.71 -0.04 -0.09 -0.23 -0.14 0.51 
             
Unemployment             
1 country -0.53 -0.56 -0.65 -0.40 -0.41        
FRITSP -0.53 -0.55 -0.20  0.03 -0.04  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.08  0.05 -0.22 
GEFRITSPNLBG -0.53 -0.53 -0.60  0.07 -0.47  0.26 -0.54  0.02  0.07  0.17  0.10 -0.40 
             
Consumption             
1 country -0.09 -0.08 -0.13  0.01 -0.47        
FRITSP -0.09 -0.08 -0.21 -0.01  0.02 -0.01  0.00 -0.01  0.02  0.05  0.20 -0.05 
GEFRITSPNLBG -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 -0.41 -0.52 -0.06 -0.01  0.01  0.11  0.25 -0.18 
             
Trade balance (% GDP)            
1 country -0.02  0.02 -0.01 -0.05  0.09        
FRITSP  0.01  0.01  0.03 -0.06  0.09 -0.05  0.03  0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02  0.02 
GEFRITSPNLBG  0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12  0.24 -0.16  0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07  0.01  0.05 
FRITSP: reform in 3 countries: France, Italy and Spain 
FRITSPGENLBE: reform in 6 countries: France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium 
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Table 9.2b: Effects after 9 years of fiscal devaluation in unilateral and multilateral 
scenarios (%-deviations from basecase) 
 FR IT SP OE GE NL BG GR FN PT IR EA 
Real producer wage           
1 country -0.01  0.14  0.11  0.13  0.05        
FRITSP -0.02  0.10  0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09  0.00 -0.06 -0.13 
GEFRITSPNLBG -0.04  0.02 -0.01 -0.16  0.02  0.20  0.11 -0.09 -0.11  0.03 -0.07  0.01 
             
GDP             
1 country  0.17  0.36  0.32  0.38  0.19        
FRITSP  0.10  0.32  0.18 -0.18 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10  0.04 
GEFRITSPNLBG  0.00  0.26  0.14 -0.25  0.11  0.44  0.21 -0.24 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10  0.10 
             
Employment             
1 country  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.02 0.02        
FRITSP  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00 -0.01  0.00 -0.05 -0.01  0.00 -0.04  0.02  0.00 
GEFRITSPNLBG -0.02 -0.01 -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.05 -0.01  0.00 -0.06  0.05  0.00 
             
Unemployment             
1 country -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02        
FRITSP -0.01  0.00 -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.04 -0.02  0.00 
GEFRITSPNLBG  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04  0.00  0.00  0.05 -0.04  0.00 
             
Consumption             
1 country  0.63  1.27  1.27  1.43  0.52        
FRITSP  0.53  1.19  0.64 -0.22 -0.26 -0.29 -0.25 -0.21 -0.16 -0.14  0.04  0.26 
GEFRITSPNLBG  0.39  1.07  0.82 -0.36  0.25  2.15  0.84 -0.34 -0.24 -0.17  0.03  0.52 
             
Trade balance (% GDP)           
1 country -0.09 -0.39 -0.37 -0.54 -0.02        
FRITSP -0.07 -0.35 -0.13  0.07  0.00  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.08 -0.06 -0.08 
GEFRITSPNLBG -0.05 -0.26 -0.15  0.15 -0.03 -0.88 -0.39  0.10  0.09  0.11 -0.07 -0.15 
FRITSP: reform in 3 countries: France, Italy and Spain 
FRITSPGENLBE: reform in 6 countries: France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium 
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Appendix 1: Micro simulations for France based on the CEPII macro 
model.  
In the main text the microsimulations regarding the French case have been conducted 
using the macro results (reduction in SSC rates corresponding to 1% of GDP) from the 
IHS model. If instead we use the results from the CEPII macro model, we obtain very 
similar results, as Figure A1.1 shows. The figure presents two couples of curves: the 
continuous ones are the percentage changes in net disposable income (by deciles of 
equivalent disposable income) for two cases already presented in the main text, while 
the dashed curves refer to the new results obtained starting from the CEPII macro 
model. We consider only the case of universal reduction of SSC rates, but the case with 
targeted cuts is similar.  
Figure A1.1: Comparison between the distributive impact of the FD with macro results 
from IHS or CEPII models, with universal reduction in SSC rates.  
 
Note: 1: increase in only the ordinary VAT rate; 2: increase in all rates. 
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Appendix 2: Micro simulations without budget balance 
As explained in the text, all the distributive results presented so far have been obtained 
under the assumption of budget balance. We have taken from the macro simulations 
only the percentage change in SSC rates (and the information on the share of low-wage 
workers), and looked for the changes in VAT rates that provide a compensating 
revenue, after taking into account that the increase in disposable income of workers 
produces modifications in personal income tax, household expenditure and cash 
benefits.  
 
We have also performed a parallel set of micro simulations, taking from the macro 
models the percentage changes in both SSC and VAT rates, even if in the microdata 
this reform is not fiscally neutral. This appendix shows briefly some results of these 
alternative simulations, making a comparison to the results presented in the main text. 
 
The following figures show, for the case in which only the standard VAT rate is 
changed, the percentage variation in net disposable incomes with and without budget 
balance. There are parallel curves of percentage changes, for the same reform simulated 
with or without budget balance. The distributive impact of each case of FD, therefore, 
does not change. The distributive results presented in the main text are therefore robust 
to a fuller consideration, in the micro simulations, of the results from the macro models. 
Similar conclusions can be reached with the two other cases of modification of the 
VAT rates; their results are not reported here for space reasons, but are available from 
the authors. 
Figure A2.1: France: Percentage change in net income after FD with increase in standard 
VAT rate, with and without budget balance 
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Figure A2.2: Italy: Percentage change in net income after FD with increase in standard 
VAT rate, with and without budget balance 
 
 
Figure A2.3: Austria: Percentage change in net income after FD with increase in standard 
VAT rate, with and without budget balance 
 
  
-1.0% 
-0.5% 
0.0% 
0.5% 
1.0% 
1.5% 
2.0% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
reduction in all SSC rates, 
with budget balance 
reduction in all SSC rates, 
without budget balance 
reduction in SSC rates of 
low incomes, with budget 
balance 
reduction in SSC rates of 
low incomes, without budget 
balance 
-1.2% 
-0.9% 
-0.6% 
-0.3% 
0.0% 
0.3% 
0.6% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
reduction in all SSC rates, 
with budget balance 
reduction in all SSC rates, 
without budget balance 
reduction in SSC rates of 
low incomes, with budget 
balance 
reduction in SSC rates of 
low incomes, without budget 
balance 
167 
Study on fiscal devaluation 
 
Appendix 3: A uniform share of low-paid workers  
One of the alternative set of simulations performed in our study concerns the case of a 
targeted reduction of SSC rates only for low-paid workers. The share of low-paid 
workers varies across the four countries, being derived from the macro models that 
incorporate different assumptions about who should be considered as “low earner” in 
each country.  
 
In this Appendix, we set instead the same share of low earners in each country, so as to 
verify whether and by how much our results are influenced by this particular choice. In 
practice, we set this share as 30%. Since for France this is the share used in the main 
simulations, the results for France do not change, and we concentrate on the other three 
cases: Italy and Spain, which start from a share of low earners much higher than 30%, 
and Austria, starting form a much lower share than 30%. For this sensitivity analysis we 
do not change the VAT rates that guarantee revenue neutrality ex post, but modify the 
SSC revenue. In the case of Italy, for example, the share of low-paid workers falls from 
45.7% to 30%, so the percentage reduction of the SSC rates for this group should 
increase with respect to the 26% used in the main exercise, so that it still corresponds to 
1% of GDP from the macro model. It turns out that in Italy the % reduction of SSC 
rates for the now smaller group of low earners goes up from 26% to 55%. For Spain, 
the reduction in the pool of beneficiaries means that for them the SSC rates are set to 
nearly zero. For Austria, instead of reducing SSC rates by 83.65% for the poorest 
18.12%, now they are reduced by 46% for the poorest 30%. The VAT rates remain the 
same as in the previous scenarios. 
 
Figure A3.1 shows, for Italy, the % change in net disposable income, by deciles of 
disposable income, after the fiscal devaluation, for the three different types of 
modifications in the VAT rates and for the two hypotheses about the number of low 
earners (46% or 30%). When the share of low earners falls, so that the same aggregate 
benefit is concentrated on a smaller group, the reform becomes more progressive, since 
the beneficiaries of the SSC cut belong on average to lower deciles than before. The 
reduction in the Gini index after the reform is therefore higher for all the three 
hypotheses on the new structure of VAT rates. Figure A3.2 shows that when almost 
half of employees are considered as low earners, then even many households belonging 
to the richest deciles benefit from the targeted cut in SSC, since at least one of their 
members qualify for the reduction. With a more selective definition of the low earners, 
however, the share of households benefiting from the cut in contributions falls, with 
respect to income, much more rapidly than before, so that the whole measure is more 
progressive. In Austria, on the other hand, the reforms become slightly less progressive. 
Spain provides results that are very similar to those of Italy, with a greater share of total 
benefits concentrated among the lower deciles.  
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Figure A3.1 Italy: % change in net disposable income after the FD with two different 
hypotheses on the share of low-paid workers, by deciles of equivalent disposable income 
Figure A3.2 Italy: share of households with at least one low earner, for two definitions of 
low earners and by deciles of equivalent disposable income 
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Figure A3.3 Austria: % change in net disposable income after the FD with two different 
hypotheses on the share of low-paid workers 
 
Figure A3.4 Spain: % change in net disposable income after the FD with two different 
hypotheses on the share of low-paid workers 
Table A3.1 compares the change in the Gini index after the FD when the SSC reduction 
is general and if it is concentrated on low incomes, defined both differently in each 
country, and also with a common 30% share. The distributive results with the 30% 
share are similar to those with differentiated rates of low earners. As expected, in Italy 
and Spain there is a more redistributive effect, while in Austria the FD becomes less 
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progressive when the reduction in SSC is spread to a broader pool, but the signs of the 
Gini variations change only in one case for Spain, but also in this case the direction of 
the effect of targeting the cut in SSC rates is the same as before. We can therefore 
conclude that the simulations performed in the main text with cuts in SSC targeted to 
low incomes are comparable among the different countries.  
Table A3.1 % change in the Gini index of disposable equivalent income before and after 
FD, with different shares of low-paid workers 
 France Italy Spain Austria 
1 Increase in ordinary VAT rate     
1.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.67% +0.19% +2.2% +0.37% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes 
    (different national shares of low earners) 
-0.31% -0.77% -0.46% -0.61% 
1.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  
 (common 30% share) 
-0.31% -1.01% -0.82% -0.55% 
 
2 Increase in all VAT rates 
    
2.1 change in all SSC rates  +0.73% +0.28% +2.26% +0.43% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  
    (different national shares of low earners) 
-0.30% -0.70% -0.39% -0.56% 
2.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  
     (common 30% share) 
-0.30% -1.16% -0.75% -0.51% 
 
3 Uniform VAT rate 
    
3.1 change in all SSC rates  +2.03% +0.90% +2.76% +0.79% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  
    (different national shares of low earners) 
+0.99% -0.09% +0.11% -0.20% 
3.2 change in SSC rates on low incomes  
    (common 30% share) 
+0.99% -0.33% -0.27% -0.15% 
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